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ABSTRACT 
In the eyes of many experts, the world is moving away from oil as a cheap energy 
source.  As this future unfolds, the United States may perform a leading role as the 
planet’s premier energy consumer.  Solar and nuclear power provide possibilities for this 
future which represent the extremes in terms of energy supply.  The question this thesis 
asks is: what are the security implications of a substantial shift in energy policy in either a 
solar or nuclear direction?  The analysis begins with a question, “What is a substantial 
shift?” and defines substantial in terms of energy shortage, energy independence, and 
climate change.  The proposed energy futures to match these shifts are then judged with 
respect to three security criteria: resource access, nuclear weapons proliferation, and 
infrastructure protection.  Accepting many uncertainties with future economic and 
technical solutions (even as proven systems are proposed), solar power provides the most 
stable future in terms of security alone.  However, because these options are not mutually 
exclusive, both cases offer security challenges which are addressed in the concluding 
recommendations. 
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0B0BI. INTRODUCTION  
10B10BA. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
Within the context of global warming, fossil fuel price increases, and national 
security concerns over energy recourses there exists a strong movement toward the 
adoption of alternative energy strategies.  Two key alternatives that address this concern 
are nuclear and solar energy.  These strategies are the chosen focal point for this thesis 
because they represent what might be called the boundary cases of the alternative energy 
spectrum.  On one hand, nuclear energy represents a more mature technology, requiring 
traditional infrastructure, massive technical and bureaucratic capability, and access to a 
limited natural resource: uranium.  Alternatively, solar energy embraces a variety of 
solutions from photovoltaic cells (PV) or wind energy to hydro-electric power or bio-
mass fuels.  Solar energy solutions will likely require a significant departure from 
traditional infrastructure systems.  This gives rise to the research question at hand: what 
are the security implications for a substantial shift toward either solar or nuclear energy, 
and should one or the other be preferred for that reason? 
11B11B . IMPORTANCE 
The enormous consumption of energy by advanced industrial societies confronts 
their leaders with at least three significant challenges.  First, assured access to energy, 
especially oil, at reasonable prices has become a national security priority, and a 
contributing factor to tension between nations.  Second, fossil fuel consumption has been 
linked to environmental degradation and global warming according to the bulk of 
scientific analysis.FF1FF  Global warming’s climate change predictions include harmful 
effects ranging from food shortages and socio-economic instability to loss of endangered 
                                                 
1  R. K. Pachauri, Andy Reisinger and Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, "Climate Change 
2007 Synthesis Report," IPCC. 
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species and shoreline property.FF2FF  Thirdly, many predict that access to cheap fossil fuel 
energy is nearing a peak in production, after which such energy sources will become 
scarce, hence prohibitively expensive.FF3FF   
Although solar and nuclear energy combined only account for a fraction of the 
energy provided by oil at present, each is proposed to replace oil dominance within the 
next 50 years or so.  Because of energy’s strategic value, any movement with regard to 
energy production has important security implications. 
12B12BC. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES 
To narrow down the many problems with nuclear and solar power to concerns 
with security questions alone, one can begin with questions surrounding either the 
resources required to support a system or the protection of the system itself.  To evaluate 
an energy option, policy makers should favor choices which offer freedom from the 
security problems surrounding control over oil.  Ideally, countries should not be able to 
hold each other hostage over energy resources.  Because each energy option requires 
vastly different types of resources, one would expect different approaches to this 
problem.  The resource security question for nuclear energy comes coupled with concern 
for nuclear weapons proliferation.  A good strategy option will need to account for this 
security problem, a problem great enough to potentially outweigh other benefits.  Finally, 
there is the problem for securing the energy systems themselves.  Here both options offer 
very different solutions.  Nuclear offers a central-plant-based power solution, which is 
easily matched to today’s grid platform.  Solar energy will likely involve a variety of 
power generation capabilities both large and small, which may also be distributed to end 
users in new ways.  Protection of each of these systems will require different approaches. 
In the simplest terms, nuclear power will involve a few high-value targets, solar power  
 
                                                 
2  Siobhan Peters et al., Stern Review: The Economics of Climate Change (Cambridge CB2: 
Cambridge University Press, 2007). 
3  Robert L. Hirsch, Peaking of World Oil Production: Recent Forecasts (Washington D.C.: U.S. 
Department of Energy, National Energy Technology Laboratory, 2007). 
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will likely provide large numbers of small-value targets.  The aim of this thesis is to 
consider which, on balance, represents the better overall choice from the point of view of 
national security. 
13B13BD. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Nuclear and solar energy constitute the major divisions in alternative energy 
options in the future.  Not surprisingly, literature on both of these subjects is fraught with 
controversy.  Furthermore, there is a lack of comprehensiveness to the discussion, as 
most articles only focus on a particular aspect of the debate.  There is a tendency to show 
the strengths of one side and the weaknesses of the other.  Critics of nuclear power claim 
nuclear power is too environmentally hazardous,FF4FF costs too much,FF5FF presents a security 
threat,FF6FF or will suffer the same fate as oil by virtue of being a non-renewable energy 
source.FF7FF  Experts who favor nuclear power highlight nuclear power’s low carbon 
emissions record,FF8FF economic feasibility,FF9FF and maintain that nuclear power can be more 
environmentally friendly than alternatives.FF10FF  Solar power has drawn its share of critics 
as well.  These experts claim that solar power is incapable of meeting demand 
efficiently,FF11FF involves toxic chemicals,FF12FF is the most expensive energy option,FF13FF and 
                                                 
4  Helen Caldicott, Nuclear Power is Not the Answer (New York: New Press: Distributed by W.W. 
Norton & Co, 2006), 39. 
5  Arjun Makhijani et al., "Carbon-Free and Nuclear-Free a Roadmap for U.S. Energy Policy," 
Takoma Park, MD: IEER Press; Muskegon, MI: RDR Books. 
6  David Bodansky, Nuclear Energy: Principles, Practices, and Prospects, 2nd ed. (New York: 
Springer, 2004), 512-513. 
7  David L. Goodstein, Out of Gas: The End of the Age of Oil, 1st ed. (New York: W.W. Norton, 
2004), 106. 
8  John Deutch et al., The Future of Nuclear Power: An Interdisciplinary MIT Study (Boston, MA: 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2003), ix. 
9  Steve Kidd, "Can we Ever Build Lots of New Nuclear Plants?" Nuclear Engineering International, 
March 31, 2004, 14. 
10  Gwyneth Cravens, Power to Save the World: The Truth about Nuclear Energy, 1st ed. (New York: 
Alfred A. Knopf, 2007), 193. 
11  Howard C. Hayden, The Solar Fraud: Why Solar Energy Won't Run the World, 2nd ed. (Pueblo 
West, CO: Vales Lake Pub, 2004), 98. 
12  Cravens, Power to Save the World: The Truth about Nuclear Energy, 249. 
13  Jerry Taylor, "Powering America: On the Road to Real Energy Solutions," The RIPON Society 3, 
no. 2 (June 12, 2007), 33. 
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will not develop fast enough to meet coming energy challenges.FF14FF  Solar advocates 
counter with the fact that solar economics are becoming more favorable,FF15FF solar energy 
taps into an infinite resource,FF16FF solar solutions are cleaner than nuclear power,FF17FF and 
solar power allows an escape from grid infrastructure costFF18FF and security problems.FF19FF  
Most authors recognize the inherent appeal of solar power; they only disagree about 
timing and the extent of its viability relative to anticipated demand. 
With respect to security, expert analysis typically approaches the subject of 
nuclear and solar security from two angles.  First, there is the question of the security of 
the resources that are required to produce the energy.  Second, there is the question of the 
security of the infrastructure that makes up the energy systems themselves. 
The national security concerns surrounding energy have been magnified by the 
prominence of oil, a cheap energy source that is generally consumed far from where it is 
produced.  As nations perceive their stocks of cheap fuel dwindling, there has been a rise 
in the nationalization and militarization of energy reserves, a grave concern for the 
United States as a chief defender of a free energy market.FF20FF  Writers such as Michael 
Klare have emphasized the ways in which disputes about oil might lead to international 
conflict. FF21FF   Energy independence as a strategic goal for the U.S. has been a focal point 
                                                 
14  Michael T. Klare, Rising Powers, Shrinking Planet: The New Geopolitics of Energy, 1st ed. (New 
York: Metropolitan Books, 2008), 33. 
15  Peter Lorenz, Dickon Pinner and Thomas Seitx, "The Economics of Solar Power," The McKinsey 
Quarterly (July 9, 2008), 3; Travis Bradford, Solar Revolution: The Economic Transformation of the 
Global Energy Industry (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2006), 132; Jennifer Kho, "Charting a Course to 
Low-Cost Solar," GreenTechMedia, http://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/charting-a-path-to-low-cost-
solar-1128.html (accessed August 3, 2008). 
16  Bradford, Solar Revolution: The Economic Transformation of the Global Energy Industry, 5. 
17  Caldicott, Nuclear Power is Not the Answer, 171-172. 
18  Bradford, Solar Revolution: The Economic Transformation of the Global Energy Industry, 17. 
19  S. L. Klein, Power to Change the World: Alternative Energy and the Rise of the Solar City, 1st ed. 
(Charleston, SC: BookSurge Publishing, 2008), 372. 
20  Daniel Moran and James A. Russell, Energy Security and Global Politics: The Militarization of 
Resource Management, eds. Daniel Moran and James A. Russell (London; New York: Rutledge, 2009), 7-
14. 
21  Klare, Rising Powers, Shrinking Planet: The New Geopolitics of Energy, 339. 
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since the 1973 oil crisis, and has been echoed in national policy statements since 9-11.FF22FF  
Calls to develop alternative energy as part of a national strategy can be found in several 
government documents.FF23FF  Literature covering both solar and nuclear energy options 
touch on this possibility as well.  A key question in this discussion: will the different 
energy options provide energy free from strategic struggles over resources?  Klare makes 
the prediction that a struggle for uranium may well resemble the present day contests for 
oil.FF24FF The supply of nuclear material can be enhanced by reprocessing spent nuclear fuel 
in fast breeder reactors (FBR).  These breeder reactors can take spent material and 
produce fissionable plutonium, which could increase the energy yield from a unit of 
uranium fifty to one hundred fold.FF25FF  Unfortunately, the resulting supply of high-grade 
fissionable material presents additional risks because of its potential duel use in weapons 
programs. 
The solar question is more difficult to predict, given the diversity of relevant 
technologies available.FF26FF  From a security perspective, solar energy has particular appeal 
because access to the sun is universal.  Solar energy is not likely to become a resource for 
which nations compete.  However, a solar energy infrastructure may require resources 
that prove to be scarce, depending on the technology chosen.  Production capacity for 
exotic elements such as germanium or gallium may need to be increased,FF27FF and nations 
with greater access may enjoy a superior position.  
                                                 
22  George W. Bush, "2006 State of the Union Address," White House, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/stateoftheunion/2006/ (accessed June 19, 2008). 
23  Thomas E. Morehouse Jr. "Climate, Energy, and Security—A Related Set of Challenges," In 
Global Climate Change National Security Implications, eds. Carolyn Pumphrey and others. (Carlisle 
Barracks, Pa: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2008), 281; CNA Corporation, National 
Security and the Threat of Climate Change (Alexandria, VA: CNA Corp, 2007); National Commission on 
Energy Policy, Ending the Energy Stalemate. A Bipartisan Strategy to Meet America's Energy Challenges 
(Washington DC: National Commission on Energy Policy, 2004). 
24  Klare, Rising Powers, Shrinking Planet: The New Geopolitics of Energy, 61. 
25  Von Hippel, Frank N., "Plutonium and Reprocessing of Spent Nuclear Fuel," Science 293, no. 
5539 (Sep. 28, 2001), 2397. 
26  Mons Lonnroth , Thomas B. Johansson and Peter Steen, Solar Versus Nuclear: Choosing Energy 
Futures (Oxford: Pergamon P., 1980), 82-91; Bradford, Solar Revolution: The Economic Transformation of 
the Global Energy Industry, 238. 
27  Hayden, The Solar Fraud: Why Solar Energy Won't Run the World, 197. 
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Blended with the discussion of resource security is a challenge unique to the 
nuclear energy question, nuclear weapons proliferation.  Concern over nuclear material 
and its use in developing a nuclear weapon has been a major policy issue in the United 
States.FF28FF  Nuclear advocates are quick to point out that the eight original nuclear powers 
did not develop their nuclear capabilities through energy programs.FF29FF  However, recent 
history in both India and Pakistan can serve to demonstrate than an energy program can 
be a useful avenue for developing a nuclear weapon program.FF30FF  Although nuclear 
energy production can function without enrichment processes with can lead to nuclear 
weapons,FF31FF the steps to build a nuclear weapon capability from an energy program may 
be too temping for nations to resist.FF32FF  Breeder reactors could exacerbate the problem by 
multiplying the volume of weapons-grade nuclear material available.  This security 
concern grows as national leaders consider the possibility of such materials falling into 
the hands of terrorists.  Ideas to secure nuclear materials range from internationalization 
of enrichment activityFF33FF to the traditional security structures such as those the U.S. has 
built in Eastern Europe and Russia.FF34FF  There is a need within the literature to portray the 
potential balance between the benefits of plentiful energy supply to national security 
against the costs for potential misbehavior with weapons proliferation.   
The infrastructure security question involves examining the infrastructure with 
respect to each energy choice as a network of links and nodes required to function.  Ted 
                                                 
28  The Whitehouse, The National Security Strategy of the United States (Washington D.C.: The 
Whitehouse, 2006); National Nuclear Security Administration, Reducing Nuclear and Radiological Threats 
Worldwide (Washington D.C.: National Nuclear Security Administration, 2007). 
29  Cravens, Power to Save the World: The Truth about Nuclear Energy, 152. 
30  William Langewiesche, The Atomic Bazaar: Dispatches from the Underground World of Nuclear 
Trafficking, 1st paperback ed. (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2008), 70-103; Joseph Cirincione, 
Jon B. Wolfsthal and Miriam Rajkumar, Deadly Arsenals: Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Threats, 2nd 
ed. (Washington, D.C: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005), 225,243-246. 
31  Cravens, Power to Save the World: The Truth about Nuclear Energy, 163. 
32  Langewiesche, The Atomic Bazaar: Dispatches from the Underground World of Nuclear 
Trafficking, 84-85. 
33  Cravens, Power to Save the World: The Truth about Nuclear Energy, 439. 
34  Matthew Bunn and others, "Securing the Bomb an Agenda for Action," Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University: Nuclear Threat Initiative. 
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Lewis’ textbook, Critical Infrastructure Protection in Homeland Security, provides a 
comprehensive review for the science of infrastructure network protection.  He offers an 
analytical methodology for analyzing the network with regard to vulnerability and fault 
propagation.  In other words, he examines how brittle the network is when things go 
wrong.  Can one problem cascade into many?  With respect to the solar verses nuclear 
power infrastructures, solar proponents like Travis Bradord, the President of the 
Promethius Institute for Sustainable Development, indicate that the distributed power 
generation in solar power schemes will vastly reduce the centralized nature of the current 
grid system.FF35FF  This will significantly alter the network analysis picture and change the 
risk equation for solar energy.  This analysis raises the question of resilience in 
infrastructure design. 
Resilience is a term that has recently emerged at the forefront of strategic thought 
with regard to infrastructure systems.  C. S. Holling, an ecologist, is frequently cited to 
define resilience.  He states: 
Resilience determines the persistence of relationships within a system and 
is a measure of the ability of these systems to absorb changes of state 
variables, driving variables, and parameters, and still persist.FF36 
Resilience in infrastructure is the “ability of a system to recover from adversity, 
either back to its original state or an adjusted state based on new requirements.”FF37FF  
Threats in the world of resilience advocates are not specific and not predictable, and since 
protection generally requires prediction, resilience offers a better approach.  The question 
for alternative energy is which system provides greater resilience?  Here solar advocates 
are most vocal.  They are quick to point out that nuclear power involves the same rigid  
 
 
                                                 
35  Bradford, Solar Revolution: The Economic Transformation of the Global Energy Industry, 17. 
36  C. S. Holling, "Resilience and Stability of Ecological Systems," Annual Review of Ecology and 
Systematics 4 (1973), 17. 
37  John A. McCarthy, "Introduction: From Protection to Resilience: Injecting “Moxie” into the 
Infrastructure Security Continuum," CIP Program Discussion Paper Series; George Mason University 
(2007), 2. 
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infrastructure systems as present day fossil fuel systems,FF38FF and that plant failures can be 
catastrophic. FF39FF  Nuclear proponents emphasize the quality of their designs and resilience 
provided by better technology. 
14B14BE. METHODS AND SOURCES 
Before evaluating each system with respect to security criteria, it is necessary to 
evaluate how much the energy market should change, and what these changes would look 
like for nuclear or solar power.  For the purposes of this study, demand will be modeled 
after the United States, and energy solutions considered will be those technologies with 
some recorded performance.  Sources will include literature as provided within the 
review augmented by government statistics or reports to explain resource locations and 
energy demand. 
Criteria for this evaluation will engage both resource security and infrastructure 
protection questions, but will also consider broader questions of feasibility, as follows: 
•  Resource access: Will materials to support the energy options become national 
strategic resources to the degree that oil is today?  Where are the resources?  Who 
controls them?  A system where resources are distributed abundantly throughout 
the international system would be preferable to a system where resources are 
concentrated within a few nations. 
• Nuclear weapons proliferation: Although unique to the nuclear option, this is a 
key aspect to this analysis.  No examination of nuclear energy can be complete 
without addressing this concern.  Security solutions which minimize nuclear  
energy’s facilitation of nuclear weapon development can be seen as more 
desirable if they reduce the concern to a level which would be present without 
nuclear power. 
                                                 
38  Bradford, Solar Revolution: The Economic Transformation of the Global Energy Industry, 82. 
39  Ibid., 72; Caldicott, Nuclear Power is Not the Answer, 64-68. 
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• Network security: How vulnerable are nuclear energy networks when compared 
to solar?  This will apply many of Lewis’ network security questions to each 
energy option.  Resilience will be a sub-component of this discussion.   
15B15BF. THESIS OVERVIEW 
On approach to the security criteria, the following chapters will first address the 
difficult questions about the scope of required changes, and how that change would be 
manifest for each alternative energy system.  Each driver toward change, fossil fuel 
shortage, energy independence, and climate change, provides a different set of goals for 
change.  Once these goals have been scoped, a following chapter will match an 
alternative energy future to each target.  This way the security concerns as with regard to 
the thesis criteria are measured against an alternative energy movement tailored to a 
specific goal calling for the change.  The criteria chapters will consider these inputs, 
while recognizing that a range of possibilities exist for each.  As such, the criteria 
evaluations will provide a more qualitative measurement.  The report will provide a 
chapter for each criterion followed by a summation of all evaluations.  The conclusion 
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1B1BII. SIZING THE REQUIREMENT  
Because the present research question examines a substantial shift in energy 
policy, it is worth considering what counts as “substantial” in this context.  When judged 
as a driver toward alternative energy, the significance of any policy shift derives from its 
movement away from fossil fuels.   So how far must the U.S. go in moving away from 
fossil fuels to make a difference?  Each challenge, energy security, climate change, and 
oil scarcity, presents a different context to answer this question.  The intent below is not 
to nail down an exact target, but to determine a general magnitude of change.  Of 
particular interest will be the transportation sector, in which the substitution of non-fossil 
fuels for petroleum is universally recognized as especially difficult. Can a given policy 
produce significant change without requiring a major, enforced transformation of the 
transportation sector?  The necessarily speculative (but almost certainly high) costs of 
such a transformation would have to be included in any calculation of the efficacy of the 
proposed policy. 
As a point of departure, some explanation of the security challenges with the 
existing petroleum-based energy markets will help shape the consideration of 
alternatives.  This study will use the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) 
reference case within the Annual Energy Outlook 2008 to represent current policy 
direction.FF40FF  Any alternative solution should not replicate the faults of the status quo.  
Good understanding of existing problems will enhance appreciation of nuclear or solar 
strategies and help refine criteria for evaluating options.  The purpose of these 
requirements is to define the extent of change required, not to replace the security 
criterion.  The bases of these requirements are broader than the security focus of this 
paper, but the latter cannot be realistically considered unless they are taken into account. 
                                                 
40  Energy Information Agency (EIA), "Annual Energy Outlook, 2008," U.S. Department of Energy, 
http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/aeo/index.html (accessed September 15, 2008). 
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16B16BA. OIL SCARCITY 
As mentioned in the literature review, fossil fuels are finite resources, and as such 
any drawdown in supply which could affect the rate of production would substantially 
increase the value of remaining reserves.  This shift in value could effect a considerable 
change in strategic power balance beyond what economic considerations alone would 
imply.  Because the topic here is alternative energy, the question becomes when does oil 
scarcity necessitate alternative energy?  As mentioned, there are a number of experts with 
a vast range of predictions.  Even when examining a single source there is variability.  
Figure 1 provides the U.S. Geological Survey and the Energy Information Agency’s 
future outlook with respect to this question. 
 
Figure 1.   EIA Oil Production ScenariosFF41 
EIA maintains that the predictions in Figure 1 are an update to Hubbert’s original 
predictions using more reliable data.FF42FF  The EIA reference case predicts a world 
                                                 
41  Energy Information Agency (EIA), "Long-Term World Oil Supply Scenarios," U.S. Department of 
Energy, 
http://www.eia.doe.gov/pub/oil_gas/petroleum/feature_articles/2004/worldoilsupply/oilsupply04.html 
(accessed September 2008). 
42  Ibid. 
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production growth curve of less than two percent annually.FF43FF  For this discussion, 
adopting a 2% growth rate may be a reasonable starting point.  As such, oil production 
appears to reach a peak between 2025 and 2047.  It is worth noting that the EIA reference 
case does predict some reductions in U.S. demand as a result of the Energy Independence 
and Security Act, but does not include the more wide-ranging measures considered in the 
following chapters. 
Without getting into a highly speculative discussion, what does this problem 
suggest for alternative energy?  It means that whatever changes are required, they should 
be well underway by 2030, the timeframe targeted for this effort.  Because of the 
uncertainties in Figure 1 with respect to actual reserves, and because of the complex 
economic picture this graph represents, the oil scarcity question does not yield a clearly 
defined target beyond a rough timeframe for change. 
17B17B . ENERGY SECURITY 
The fourth essential task outlined in the U.S. National Security Strategy is to 
“ignite an era of economic growth through free markets and free trade.”FF44FF  Enhancing 
energy security is part of this strategy with a goal to “open, integrate and diversify energy 
markets to ensure energy independence.”FF45FF  The document goes on to suggest that an 
energy economy where a few countries control a majority of the resources is dangerous, 
and mentions the “oil curse,” a label for oil revenue and its role in encouraging corruption 
and resisting reform in economies singularly focused on oil.FF46FF  Table 1 illustrates the 
current lack of diversity in the oil market today. 
 
                                                 
43  Energy Information Agency (EIA), "International Energy Outlook, 2008 Chapter 2 - Liquid Fuels," 
U.S. Department of Energy, http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/ieo/liquid_fuels.html (accessed September 15, 
2008). 
44  The Whitehouse, The National Security Strategy of the United States (Washington D.C.: The 
Whitehouse, 2006). 
45 Ibid. 
46  Ibid. 
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Table 1.   Proven Oil Reserves and Oil Production – Top 15 
 Oil ReservesFF47   2005 Crude Oil Energy 
ProductionFF48 
Country Billion Barrels Rank % Quad Btu Rank % 
Saudi Arabia 262.30 1 20              20.60  1 13 
Canada            179.21 2 14                5.02  11 3 
Iran            136.27 3 10                8.89  4 6 
Iraq            115.00 4 9                3.99  12 3 
Kuwait            101.50 5 8                5.47  9 3 
United Arab Emirates             97.80 6 7                5.36  10 3 
Venezuela             80.01 7 6                5.74  7 4 
Russia             60.00 8 5              19.41  2 12 
Libya             41.46 9 3                3.44  13 2 
Nigeria             36.22 10 3                5.64  8 4 
Kazakhstan             30.00 11 2                2.77  14 2 
United States 20.97 12 2 10.96 3 7 
China 16.00 13 1 7.74 5 5 
Qatar 15.21 14 1 1.76 15 1 
Mexico 12.35 15 1 7.31 6 5 
Rest of World 112.36  9 43.70  28 
Total 1,316.66 157.80  
 
Three concerns should be addressed with the current energy scenario: cost to the 
U.S. economy, monopolistic control, and the nature of state control over oil.  These 
concerns are sharpened by energy’s foundational role in the U.S. economy and prominent 
national security interest.   
36B36B1. Energy Independence 
What degree of energy independence is necessary to avoid the economic damages 
which may result from continued dependence?  State misbehavior in the oil business is of 
little concern if fossil fuels become a minor part of America’s energy architecture.  In 
                                                 
47 Oil and Gas Journal Figures from Energy Information Agency (EIA), Energy Information Agency 
(EIA), "World Energy Reserves," U.S. Department of Energy, http://www.eia.doe.gov/iea/res.html 
(accessed September 15, 2008). 
48  Energy Information Agency (EIA), "World Energy Production in British Thermal Units 
(Quadrillion Btu)," U.S. Department of Energy, http://www.eia.doe.gov/iea/wepbtu.html (accessed 
September 15, 2008). 
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2007, a team of experts writing for the Center for Transportation Analysis produced a 
report to answer this very question.  Their report, Oil Independence: Achievable National 
Goal or Empty Slogan?, adds clarity to the energy independence discussion by providing 
a simple definition of oil independence.  They suggest that energy independence is 
achieved when “costs of oil to the U.S. economy dependence is so small that they would 
have no effect on our economic, military, or foreign policy.”FF49FF  Using risk analysis and 
the Oil Security Metrics Model, they determine that energy independence is achieved 
when the “estimated total economic costs of oil dependence will be less than 1% of the 
U.S. GDP with a 95% probability by 2030.”FF50FF  Costs of dependence is expressed as 
transfer of wealth from consuming nations to producing nations as consumers pay a 
premium for access.  Additionally, this cost will include loss of GDP from high oil prices 
as well as macroeconomic inefficiencies due to market volatility.FF51FF  The study examines 
a National Commission on Energy Policy (NCEP) strategy which the authors estimate 
will reduce U.S. consumption by 7.22 Million Barrels/Day and increase U.S. domestic 
supply by 3.00 Million Barrels/day, causing a net decrease of 10.22 Barrels/day in 
imports as compared to the 2007 EIA reference case (early release energy outlook) by 
2030.  The modeled NCEP strategy achieves the 1% goal, but with only 68% probability, 
below the 95% probability goal.  However, the reference case released later in 2008 
already reflects demand reduction measures and has reductions comparable to the NCEP 
results within 2 Million Barrels/day.  To approximate an energy independence target, this 
effort will set a 5-Million Barrel/day reduction goal for energy security.  This would 
equate to 10.6 Quadrillion (Quad) Btu/yr. 
Does this require a change in the transportation sector?  If the 5 Million 
Barrels/day reduction is projected against the EIA reference case as shown in Figure 2, 
the oil supply minus the reduced import supply approaches the 2030 transportation sector 
demand.  Therefore, change is not urgent by 2030, but will not be long after. 
                                                 
49  David L. Greene and et al., Oil Independence: Achievable National Goal Or Empty Slogan? (Oak 
Ridge, TN: Oak Ridge National Laboratory 2007). 
50  Ibid. 
51  Ibid. 
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Figure 2.   EIA Oil Production ScenariosFF52FF  With severe cuts in imports, the United 
States would have just enough oil remaining in 2030 to support transportation fuel 
demand from the EIA reference case. 
37B37B2. Market Distribution 
The preceding economic discussion, yields a target for energy reduction, but does 
not completely address a key flaw in the fossil energy market in ways that can be used to 
compare with other energy options.  Consider the scenario where countries hostile to the 
United States can exert monopolistic control over the energy market.  If they decide to 
use the “oil weapon” as key members of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting 
Countries (OPEC) did in the 1973 oil crisis, they can drive up prices to harm the U.S. 
economy.  Strategic interests may trump market forces causing conflict, economic chaos, 
or even market collapse.  Although complex models have been developed to examine oil 
                                                 
52  Energy Information Agency (EIA), "Oil and Natural Gas Projections," U.S. Department of Energy, 
http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/aeo/gas.html (accessed September 15, 2008). 
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energy security,FF53FF this endeavor will boil the question down to a simple principle: energy 
markets vulnerable to cartel or monopolistic control are detrimental to U.S. security 
interests.  Although there have been times where price controls have been necessary to 
counter the volatility in the oil market.FF54FF Promoting stability is the stated purpose of 
OPEC.FF55FF  However, monopolistic control provides the power for states to manipulate the 
U.S. economy, a grave security concern when considering potential hostilities between 
the U.S. and oil producing nations.  This is a key driver behind the energy independence 
target, and any new strategy should provide a measurable improvement in market 
conditions.  No single metric can capture the complexity of the energy market, but there 
are measures of market vulnerability to monopolistic control which may add to the 
discussion.   
Rather than concluding with an impression based on Table 1, one could utilize a 
more objective index to illustrate market conditions for comparison.  The U.S. 
Department of Justice (DoJ) uses the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) to gauge market 
concentration as an indicator for potential anti-trust concerns with mergers.FF56FF  The index, 
as DoJ computes it, is simply the sum of the squares of the market share percentages in a 
given market.  An HHI rating of under 1,000 indicates a freely competitive market.  A 
score of 1,000 to 1,800 reflects markets which are moderately consolidated.  HHIs above 
1,800 represent markets which are considered consolidated, and warrant the attention of 
the DoJ if future mergers change this rating by over 100.  However, the unique properties 
of the oil industry challenge any normal concept of market share.  In some cases the 
competitors are companies, and in some cases they are states (most known oil reserves 
                                                 
53 A detailed model to examine energy options with respect to oil security, here used to examine the 
benefits of hybrid vehicle technology.  David L. Greene and Paul N. Leiby, The Oil Security Metrics 
Model: A Tool for Evaluating the Prospective Oil Security Benefits of DOE’s Energy Efficiency and 
Renewable Energy R&D Programs (Oak Ridge, TN: Oak Ridge National Laboratory,2006), 
http://cta.ornl.gov/cta/Publications/Reports/ORNL_TM_2006_505.pdf (accessed September 15, 2008). 
54  Leonardo Maugeri, The Age of Oil: The Mythology, History, and Future of the World's most 
Controversial Resource (Guilford, Conn: Lyons Press, 2007), 45-46. 
55  Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), "How does OPEC Function?" 
Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries, http://www.opec.org/library/FAQs/aboutOPEC/q4.htm 
(accessed September15, 2008). 
56  U.S. Department of Justice, "The Herfindahl-Hirshman Index," U.S. Department of Justice, 
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/testimony/hhi.htm (accessed September15, 2008). 
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are currently controlled by national oil companies). Reserves are also known to be 
limited, and production market share does not match reserve inventory.  On one hand, 
annual production figures may seem appropriate for market share measurement, as one 
would expect in most cases as far as production might match sales.  Yet, there is the 
question of oil reserves.  Because demand is almost guaranteed, reserves are more 
important than marketing.  Countries with significant oil reserves have additional clout in 
setting policies and prices, beyond what their annual production numbers would indicate.  
Rather than becoming entangled in the specifics, Figure 3 provides HHI considering both  
reserves and production perspectives for discussion.  
 
Figure 3.   HHI computation for the World Oil Market.  Based on U.S. Energy 
Information Administration 2006 International Figures.FF57FF  All countries are 
treated as independent actors. 
 
                                                 
57  Energy Information Agency (EIA), "International Energy," U.S. Department of Energy, 
http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/international/contents.html (accessed September 15, 2008). 
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Figure 3 takes the existing energy market, projects into the future using a constant 
growth factor and depletes reserves in the various countries according to their current 
production rate.  Each country is treated as an independent market shareholder 
representing all companies within its borders, an assumption that is clearly unrealistic; 
though the degree of unrealism that it involves varies with political circumstances.  
Moreover, even if the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) is 
ignored, Figure 3 shows that the market is consolidating.  Obviously, if OPEC is treated 
as a single block, the scores change substantially to over 5,000 for reserve and over 2,000 
for production perspectives.  Many factors would realistically change the future as 
represented in this chart.  Price fluctuations, technology, future oil reserve discovery, 
changes in production capacity, and international conflict are but a few complications 
which damage this crystal ball.  Nonetheless, the measurement is still useful in setting a 
baseline for comparison to other energy options in terms of market consolidation.  
Otherwise, analysts are left with subjective impressions or must use more complicated 
modeling schemes whose assumptions may be even more fragile than those required 
here. 
38B38B . Market Actors 
Because the market is consolidating, each actor in the system with a significant 
market share becomes more influential.  As such, the question becomes, who are these 
actors?  Friends or foes?  Stable or unstable?  As mentioned, OPEC can potentially exert 
anti-competitive pressure on the oil market.  OPEC countries include:FF58 
• Algeria • Iraq • Qatar 
• Angola • Kuwait • Saudi Arabia 
• Ecuador • Libya • United Arab Emirates 
• Indonesia • Nigeria • Venezuela 
• Iran   
                                                 
58  Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), "Who are OPEC Member Countries?" 
Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries, http://www.opec.org/library/FAQs/aboutOPEC/q3.htm 
(accessed September 15, 2008). 
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As formidable as this block is, it is worth noting that it has not always succeeded 
in behaving like a proper cartel.  Rivalries and self interest frequently overwhelm OPEC 
direction, as happened during the 1973 oil crisis and on many lesser occasions since, 
when one member of OPEC has sought to mobilize the rest in favor of a common policy 
and failed.FF59FF  Therefore, focus on OPEC alone may fall short of a complete picture.  
Table 2 brings back the top fifteen countries with respect to oil reserves and considers 
each with respect to several metrics which may indicate good governance. 
                                                 
59  Paul Roberts, The End of Oil: On the Edge of a Perilous New World, 1st Mariner Books ed. 
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2005), 103-105. 
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GDP       
($ 
Billion)FF60 














Saudi Arabia 381 48% 13% 22,852 3.3 0.81 7 6 
Canada 1,436 -- 6% 38,614 8.5 0.96 1 1 
Iran 285 10% 12% 10,570 2.7 0.76 6 6 
Iraq no data no data 18-30% 3,600 1.9 no data 6 6 
Kuwait 111 no data 2% 39,343 4.8 0.89 4 4 
United Arab 
Emirates 191 27% 2% 37,941 6.2 0.87 6 5 
Venezuela 228 32% 9% 12,176 2.3 0.79 4 4 
Russia 1,289 20% 6% 14,705 2.5 0.80 6 5 
Libya 70 31% 30% 13,593 2.7 0.82 7 7 
Nigeria 167 24% 5% 2,028 2.2 0.47 4 4 
Kazakhstan 104 -- 7% 10,837 2.6 0.79 no data no data 
United 
States 13,807 -- 5% 45,725 7.3 0.95 1 1 
China 3,280 -- 4% 5,325 3.3 0.78 7 6 
Qatar 73 62% 1% 80,638 6.0 0.88 6 5 
Mexico 1,022 4% 4% 14,120 3.3 0.83 2 3 
Avg OPEC 199.3 33% 10% $25,685 3.6 0.77 5.7 5.3 
  Most Favorable Score 10 1 1 1 
  Least Favorable Score 0 0 7 7 
 
                                                 
60  Data from country profiles compiled from International Monetary fund data for 2007.  International 
Monetary Fund, "World Economic Outlook Database, October 2008," International Monetary Fund, 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2008/02/weodata/weoselco.aspx?g=2001&sg=All+countries 
(accessed November 8, 2008). 
61  In some cases, data from different fiscal years is used (consistent for that country) or export data is 
used to determine oil % of GDP when this value was not provided directly.  The Economist, "County 
Briefings," The Economist Newspaper Ltd, http://www.economist.com/Countries/index.cfm (accessed 
September 15, 2008). 
62 Data from CIA fact book.  Differing fiscal years for some countries was used when consistent 
information was not available.  Central Intelligence Agency, "The World Factbook," The Central 
Intelligence Agency, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/index.html (accessed 
September 15, 2008). 
63  Data from country profiles compiled from International Monetary fund data for 2007.  Figures 
provided in Current International Dollars. Iraq figure measured in dollars taken from economist data, see 
note 51. International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database, October 2008. 
64  Transparency International, "CPI Table," Transparency International, 
http://www.transparency.org/news_room/in_focus/2006/cpi_2006__1/cpi_table (accessed September 15, 
2008). 
65  United Nations Development Program, "Country Tables - 2007/2008 Report," United Nations, 
http://hdrstats.undp.org/countries/ (accessed September 15, 2008). 
66  Freedom House, "Map of Freedom in the World," Freedom House, 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=363&year=2008 (accessed September 15, 2008). 
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The United Nations Human Development Index (HDI) scores incorporate several 
factors such as literacy, life expectancy, GDP per capita, and a variety of other elements 
to provide a general rating of a country’s development health beyond economics alone.  
HDI ratings above 0.8 are considered favorable.  Transparency International’s Corruption 
Perceptions Index (CPI) is based on expert survey results compiling testimony with 
regard to bribes, corruption, and transparency.  Only 16% of the 163 surveyed countries 
scored above a seven, with over 50% of countries scoring below four.  Average Freedom 
House ratings above 5.5 are considered “not free” in terms of freedom of expression, 
political participation, civil liberties, rule of law and other similar measures.  In this case, 
several actors do not score well in terms of corruption or freedom.  Analysts who believe 
that corrupt authoritarian regimes are prone to arbitrary, counterproductive policy 
decisions have reason to be concerned with these statistics.  Even when combining the 
Freedom House Scores, the poor index scores outnumber the good ones.  Remove the 
HDI, an index influence by GDP and oil revenue, and the balance shifts in favor of poor 
ratings by over three to one.  These ratings may indicate internal problems which may 
cause security problems in the long run no matter what the relations are with the United 
States today. 
In summary, energy security entails that available alternative energy options meet 
three requirements.  First, options should meet a reduction target of approximately 10 
Quad Btu in oil energy production.  Secondly, they should provide a market 
consolidation structure comparatively better than the existing market for oil.  And third, 
control of energy resources should not be disproportionately in the hands of states 
predisposed to arbitrary or hostile actions at odds with U.S. national security. 
18B18BC. CLIMATE CHANGE 
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) lays out several 
scenarios based on the magnitude of greenhouse gas (GHG) concentrations in the 
atmosphere.  Table 3 summarizes these factors. 
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ppm ppm percent °C meters 
350 - 400 445 - 490 -85 - -50 2.0 – 2.4 0.4 – 1.4 
400 - 440 490 - 535 -60 - -30 2.4 – 2.8 0.5 – 1.7 
440 - 485 535 - 590 -30 - +5 2.8 – 3.2 0.6 – 1.9 
485 - 570 590 - 710 +10 - +60 3.2 – 4.0 0.6 – 2.4 
570 - 660 710 - 855 +25 - +85 4.0 – 4.9 0.8 – 2.9 
660 - 790 855 - 1,130 +90 - +140 4.9 – 6.1 1.0 – 3.7 
 
Experts have divided discussion with regard to emissions targets into a 
consideration of CO2 ppm levels at stabilization.FF68FF  450 ppm is generally the most 
favorable target with climate concerns are given greater weight than economy.FF69FF 
However, 550 ppm is generally regarded more affordable economically.FF70FF  Although it 
may be tempting to move toward the more affordable goal, it is worth considering that 
this analysis typically understates the economic costs of climate change.  This is 
especially true when researchers begin to take into account the possibility of rapid 
climate change as global warming pushes the weather system past tipping points from 
which it cannot recover.  Experts examining this problem typically recommend 400 ppm 
                                                 
67  Lenny Bernstein and et al., "Climate Change 2007 Synthesis Report: Summary for Policymakers," 
WMO, IPCC Secretariat, 20. 
68  Dirk Forrister, Rich Rosenzweig and Rob Youngman, An Assessment of Eleven Countries’ Climate 
Change Performance: A Comparative Evaluation of Environmental, Economic, and Technology 
Performance (Washington D.C.: National Commission on Energy Policy, 2004); Union of Concerned 
Scientists, "A Target for U.S. Emissions Reductions," Union of Concerned Scientists. 
69  Ibid. 
70  Peters and et al., Stern Review: The Economics of Climate Change, 1-712; Joseph Aldy, "The IPCC 
Working Group III Report and some Key Policy Questions," climatepolicy.org, 
http://www.climatepolicy.org/?p=39 (accessed September15, 2008). 
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or less.FF71FF  This analysis will adopt the 450 ppm target recognizing that to exceed this 
goal, alternative energy solutions will need to grow appropriately. 
How much must the U.S. energy industry change to stabilize the atmosphere at 
450 ppm?  In 2007, Amy Luers and a team of experts wrote a paper for the Union of 
Concerned Scientists to address this problem specifically.FF72FF  They suggest that to reach 
this goal, the United States must reduce emissions by 80 percent by 2050 and constrain 
cumulative emissions to between 160 and 265 giga-ton carbon-dioxide-equivalent GHG 
emissions (GtonCO2eq) for the time between 2000 and 2050 (by 2005 the total is already 
45 GtonCO2eq).FF73FF  These targets for emissions reductions are based on different ways of 
computing the U.S. share the GHG world budget.FF74FF  The 165 Gton limit is based on U.S. 
share of world population (lower goal), and the 265 Gton limit is based on U.S. share of 
current GHG emissions (upper goal). 
Achieving either of these goals means severely curtailing the cumulative 
emissions of GHG, 90% of which comes from energy production.  Figure 4 provides the 
EIA reference case cumulative emissions with emissions projections to meet both the 
lower and upper bounds of the emissions goals to stay below the 450 ppm limit. 
                                                 
71  Fred Pearce, With Speed and Violence: Why Scientists Fear Tipping Points in Climate Change 
(Boston: Beacon Press, 2007), 242; J. Hansen et al., "Target Atmospheric CO2: Where should Humanity 
Aim?" (Journal Article, Eprint arXiv:0804.1126; Revised Version Submitted to Open Atmospheric Science 
Journal, http://www.columbia.edu/~jeh1/2008/TargetCO2_20080407.pdf. (accessed September 15, 2008). 
72  Amy L. Luers et al., How to Avoid Dangerous Climate Change: A Target for U.S. Emissions 
Reductions (Cambridge, MA: Union of Concerned Scientists, 2007). 
73  Ibid. 
74  Ibid. 
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Figure 4.   EIA Reference Case Cumulative Emissions Extrapolation to 2050.  
Comparison with 450 ppm cumulative goals.  This analysis begins with a balance 
of 45,000 million metric tons in 2005.FF75 
 
Figure 4 represents an extrapolation of the EIA reference case past its 2030 
termination using a 10-year growth average to reach the 2050 total emissions goal 
comparisons.  Both upper and lower goal tracks follow the reference case initially 
allowing time for new strategies to be implemented.  Although some energy options may 
provide an opportunity for an early start, the case above assumes such a radical change 
will take some time to implement.  Even as there are many ways to reach the end states 
on the graph, it is clear that to meet the lower population-based limit will require a radical 
change in the near term.  The upper limit is more achievable because the change is 
relatively gradual.  Figure 5 shows the extent of the required annual decrease in fossil-
fuel-based energy production.  Since the lower limit case is so extreme in the early years, 
                                                 
75  Luers et al., How to Avoid Dangerous Climate Change. 
 26
the transportation sector energy consumption must be rapidly handled.  The figure 
assumes a hydrogen-based system which carries an energy premium.  Although 
hydrogen-based fuel provides a bonus in mileage, it loses ground in production.FF76 
 
Figure 5.   Fossil Fuel Annual Energy Reduction Requirement.  Hydrogen scenarios 
include a power premium to provide for hydrolysis production, but allow for a 
benefit due to more efficient driving efficiency. 
 
Figure 5 indicates the magnitude of change required to meet climate change goals.  
There are many other roadmaps to reach these goals, some of which may not include a 
hydrogen solution.  Transportation solutions vary with respect to efficiencies, and there is 
no room for a detailed analysis of all of these solutions here.  A hydrogen-based answer 
using electrolysis represents a fairly demanding plan, more demanding that other 
                                                 
76  Bodansky, Nuclear Energy: Principles, Practices, and Prospects, 594. 
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potential solutions.FF77FF  Each of these alternatives, from bio-fuels and hybrid vehicles to 
hydrogen fuel cells and full electric vehicles, has its own challenges and inefficiencies.  
The focus here on electrolysis and hydrogen provides a conservative roadmap with fewer 
GHG emissions than many other options (especially the use of fossil fuels to produce 
hydrogen) while accepting that more efficient solutions will provide a lower demand.  A 
electrolysis-hydrogen design will require an additional 2 - 7 Quad Btu capacity.  This 
addition is above the existing Quad Btu demands of the transportation sector already 
included in the reference case and in the reduction figures.  These annual figures, as 
rough as they are, when contrasted with actual and projected demand figures in Table 4 
weigh heavy, even if they are off by several percentage points. 
 
                                                 
77  Michael Wang, "Well-to-Wheels Energy and Emission Impacts of Vehicle/Fuel Systems," Center 
for Transportation Research, Argonne National Laboratory, 
http://www.transportation.anl.gov/pdfs/TA/273.pdf (accessed October 7, 2008). 
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Table 4.   EIA U.S. FF78FF and WorldFF79FF Energy Demand Projections by Sector and Fuel 









Residential 21.6 25.0 96.2 138.0 
Commercial 17.9 25.0 69.9 104.9 
Industrial 32.8 35.0 205.7 315.9 
Transportation 28.0 33.0 90.4 135.7 
Total 100.3 118.0 462.2 694.7 
Liquids 40.1 44.0 171.9 229.3 
Natural Gas 22.3 23.4 109.3 164.7 
Coal 22.5 29.9 125.8 202.2 
Nuclear 8.2 9.6 27.9 39.5 
Renewable 6.3 11.0 36.9 59.0 
 
 
Thus, it would seem that on one hand the U.S. could be faced with realigning its 
entire fossil fuel energy sources by 2022 or on the other hand introduce these substantial 
changes over the next few decades.  Because both of these scenarios are fairly large in 
scope, some have suggested that no single energy solution can handle the transition.  This 
burden sharing of carbon emissions shedding is often described in terms of “stabilization 
wedges.”  Each wedge in this discussion represents a different form of carbon emissions 
reduction measure from carbon sequestration, conservation, and telecommuting to several 
energy production changes to include both solar and nuclear options.FF80FF  Stephen Pacala 
                                                 
78  Although both breakouts are from the EIA reference case, some differences in rounding and data 
categorization has cause totals to misalign slightly.  Energy Information Agency (EIA), "Total Energy 
Supply and Disposition Summary," U.S. Department of Energy, 
http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/aeo/pdf/appa.pdf (accessed September15, 2008). 
79 Although electrical power loss is known in magnitude, it is not provided by sector.  The chart uses 
the U.S. loss proportions by sector to approximate the world loss.  Energy Information Agency (EIA), 
"Reference Case Projections by End-use Sector and Country Grouping Data Tables (2005-2030)," U.S. 
Department of Energy, http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/ieo/ieoenduse.html (accessed September 15, 2008). 
80  Robert Socolow and others, "Solving the Climate Problem: Technologies Available to Curb CO2 
Emissions," Environment 46, no. 10 (December 2004), 8-19. 
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and Robert Socolow propose a wedge combination in a 2004 Science magazine article 
which could serve as a useful starting point.FF81FF  They propose that the nuclear and solar 
solutions as part of this study would take up five out of fourteen equally sized wedges, 
around 36% of the total change required.  In order for this strategy to work, the carbon 
capture technologies for coal and natural gas power plants must become effective by 
2022, or the burden to be carried by energy options here will double.  Another five of 
these stabilization wedges require the use of more efficient fossil fuel plants and carbon 
dioxide capture and storage capabilities.  This study will use a target of 40% of the 
transfer illustrated in Figure 5, which would equate to a total change in annual production 
of between 19 and 40 Quad Btu by 2030.   
In summary, the above requirements from the three primary drivers toward 
alternative energy are: 
• OIL PEAK: A need to prepare for a sharp reduction in production capacity 
and increased oil prices by 2025 
• ENERGY INDEPENDENCE: A decrease in oil energy production in the U.S. 
by 10.6 Quad Btu/yr by 2030 
• ENERGY INDEPENDENCE: A market for energy resources more favorable 
than the current oil market both in terms of market consolidation and in terms 
of state control 
• CLIMATE CHANGE: A solar or nuclear capability to replace approximately 
19 – 40 Quad Btu in annual energy production between 2015 and 2030. 
                                                 
81  S. Pacala and R. Socolow, "Stabilization Wedges: Solving the Climate Problem for the Next 50 
Years with Current Technologies," Science 305, no. 5686 (August 13, 2004), 970. 
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• TRANSPORTATION: In all cases, the transformation of the U.S. 
transportation system will either be required before the timeframe of this 
study, or will need to be underway.  Part of this demand is included in the 
climate change goals, but an additional 2 – 7 Quad Btu will be required to 
account for a demanding electrolysis operation to produce hydrogen without 
adding significant GHG emissions. 
To be sure, meeting the climate change goal will likely exceed the requirements 
for the first two, but because the last goal is possibly too ambitious for the U.S. economy, 
it is worth examining which requirements will still be met if this one falls through.  It is 
also worth noting which force is driving what requirement.  The requirements for climate 
change are substantially different from the requirements for energy independence, a 
distinction easily overlooked. 
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2B2BIII.  ENERGY FUTURES 
19B19BA. SCENARIO SCOPE 
To discuss the implications of a push in either direction, solar or nuclear, this 
analysis must first describe what competing scenarios about the future of energy 
represent in terms of the types of assets requiring protection and the nature of their 
demands on resources.  The purpose here is to describe what the United States must 
protect in general.  Because the thrust of this study is security, economic concerns are 
only addressed to the extent that they effect policy options relevant to security.  Energy 
economics will change substantially with policy decisions, changes in supply and demand 
for different energy resources, changes in transportation costs, and a host of other factors 
better handled in other studies.  What follows is a brief overview of how the demands of 
Chapter II would be met with either nuclear or solar energy 
20B20B . MEETING ENERGY DEMAND 
Before dividing the discussion into the nuclear and solar components, readers 
should understand that replacing a Quad Btu of fossil fuel energy production may not 
involve a straightforward exchange.  Each energy solution comes with its own energy 
demands.  Experts examine this in a number of ways in order to determine a common 
metric for purposes of comparison: energy return on investment (EROI).  EROI is the 
ratio of energy produced versus the energy used in the production process, while most 
people measure energy as the quantity delivered to customers.  This EROI ratio also 
captures the energy consumed along the way, in the process of plant construction, 
mining, drilling, shipping etc.  Table 5 provides a summary of expert estimates of EROI 
for various energy solutions.  The most desirable energy options would have high EROI 
ratios, producing significantly more energy than consumed. 
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Table 5.   Reported Energy Return on Investment Values 
Energy Source EROI % 2006 Energy ProductionFF82 
Processed Liquid Fuel  
(Gasoline, 2000)FF83 
10 40% 
Coal (2000)FF84 5 23% 
Delivered Natural GasFF85 5 22% 
Hydro w/reservoirFF86 205 3% 
Corn EthanolFF87 1.24 0.5% 
NuclearFF88 16 8% 
Solar PVFF89 10 0.01% 
Solar Thin Film PVFF90 7.5 - 
Solar CSPFF91 72 0.03% 
WindFF92 30 0.26% 
 
                                                 
82 Assumes 99% transportation is gasoline and that the proportion of this demand consumed as diesel 
has a comparable EROI.  Energy Information Agency (EIA), Annual Energy Outlook, 2008. 
83  Cutler J. Cleveland, "Net Energy from the Extraction of Oil and Gas in the United States," Energy 
30 (2005), 781. 
84  L. Gagnon, "Life Cycle Assessments Confirm the Need for Hydropower and Nuclear Energy," 
http://www.osti.gov/servlets/purl/839326-jpdcFb/native/; http://www.osti.gov/servlets/purl/839326-
jpdcFb/native/ File transfer mode: application/pdf. 
85 Delivered 1,250 miles.  Ibid. 
86  Ibid. 
87  Hosein Shapouri, James A. Duffield and Michael S. Groboski, Estimating the Net Energy Balance 
of Corn Ethanol (Washington D.C.: U.S. Department of Agriculture, 1995). 
88  Gagnon, Life Cycle Assessments Confirm the Need for Hydropower and Nuclear Energy, Americas 
Nuclear Energy Symposium (ANES 2004), Miami, FL, 4. 
89 Value for standard conditions.  Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy, "What is the 
Energy Payback for PV?" U.S. Dept. of Energy, Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy, 
http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS48749; http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS48749. 
90 Value for standard conditions. Ibid. 
91 Assumed 30-yr lifespan for CSP plant.  Favorable conditions.  Solar Energy Technologies Program, 
Concentrating Solar Power (Golden, CO: National Renewable Energy Laboratory,2008), 
http://solareis.anl.gov/documents/docs/NREL_CSP_1.pdf (accessed October 7, 2008). 
92 Value taken for favorable conditions.  Ida Kubiszewski and Cutler J. Cleveland, "Energy Return on 
Investment (EROI) for Wind Energy" In Encyclopedia of Earth, ed. Cutler J. Cleveland, 2008th ed. 
(Washington D.C.: Environmental Information Coalition, National Council for Science and the 
Environment, 2008), 1. 
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Before considering the statistics in Table 5, one should first understand the 
limitations of this type of simplification.  First of all, these figures are frequently based 
on the locations of existing supply.  The EROI of a solar plant in Alaska will be vastly 
different from a plant in the desert.  The EROI of natural gas will change significantly 
depending on storage and shipping requirements.  Coal can change drastically depending 
on location and transport needs.  EROI data is in such respects inherently speculative, 
laden with controversy, and at times tainted with advocacy.  These facts do not detract 
from the importance of this measurement as part of energy policy analysis.  Energy 
strategists should reject any solution which does not produce significantly more energy 
than it consumes.  One does not build a store that only sells to its employees.  As this 
debate matures, one would expect EROI data to become more refined, and this analysis 
should be revised appropriately.  For this effort, these figures provide a rough scope for 
security discussion.  The intent is not to propose an optimal solution, just a possible one 
with enough accuracy to allow security issues to be address credibly.   
Accepting the shortcomings of these numbers, EROI can be used to represent a 
baseline of existing system efficiency.  Using the EROI figures and percentages of 
existing production, this examination will use an EROI of 14 to represent the starting 
EROI for the reference case, and 6.25 to represent fossil fuel systems to be replaced.  For 
example, 10 Quad Btu of fossil fuel production will consume 1.7 Btu of energy.  If the 
choice for replacement is in Solar Concentrated Solar Plant (CSP) production, with an 
EROI of 72, the new system need only provide around 8.5 Quad Btu to be comparably 
effective.  Equation 1 can be used to make any number of comparisons. 
 
 
Equation 1.   Calculation for Energy Option Replacement. 
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The target for this chapter is to provide a rough approximation of the magnitude 
of the systems required to make the changes requested in Chapter II so that the study can 
move on to security criteria with scenarios which account for the power demands of the 
solutions themselves, a distinction which places limits on the feasibility of options, at 
least in the short run.  EROI points the examination toward energy solutions which can 
provide more bang for each Btu. 
21B21BC. NUCLEAR FUTURE 
Painting a picture of a nuclear future requires answers for two key questions.  
First, what facilities are required to meet the new demands?  Second, what are the key 
resources required for these facilities to provide the power?  For the most part, these 
predictions will be based on existing technology.  Analysis based on speculation of 
unproven (although promising) systems will add to the uncertainty in these projections 
which already bear many assumptions. 
39B39B1. Nuclear Plant Requirement 
The United States already possesses a robust nuclear power production capability.  
The 104 plants produce 8.21 Quad Btu of energy every year, 8% of the total primary 
energy market.FF93FF  They meet this demand with just over 99,000 MWe in plant capacity 
(~12,000 MWe per Quad Btu).  The U.S. nuclear plant inventory consists of mostly 
boiled water reactors (BWR) and pressurized water reactors (PWR), both traditional 
proven designs which have been around for decades.  These reactor types and their 
variants make up for over 85% of the world reactor inventory.FF94FF  Table 6 provides a 
plant requirement for the reduction goals in Chapter II based on existing plant 
efficiencies, and a standard 1,000 MWe future plant capacity. 
                                                 
93  Energy Information Agency (EIA), "U.S. Nuclear Reactor List," U.S. Department of Energy, 
http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/nuclear/page/nuc_reactors/operational.xls (accessed September 15, 2008). 
94 See Appendix with World Nuclear Association Data. 
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Table 6.   Nuclear plant requirements to meet reduction goals 













 EROI  6.25  16.00        
 Energy Independence  10.6  9.5  115,000  115  2030  
 Emission Upper**  19.0  17.4  210,000  210  2030  
 Emissions Lower  40.0  36.6  442,000  442  2022  
 Addition for Hydrogen Upper  2.0  1.8  22,000  22  2030  
 Addition for Hydrogen Lower  7.0  6.4  77,000  77  2022  
 Total Emissions Upper  21.0  19.2  232,000  232  2030  
 Total Emissions Lower  47.0  43.0  519,056  519  2022  
      
*Use existing MWe/Quad Btu ratio: 12,084  
Nuclear GHG Emissions = 2% of fossil fuel emissions so a
slight penalty is applied to the Nuclear Requirement:FF95 1.02  
 
Table 6 highlights a few key challenges with the reduction goals.  Energy 
independence requires more than twice today’s nuclear capability by 2030.  For the 
United States to do its part to restrict the atmosphere to 450 ppm CO2Eq GHG 
concentration, the nation will have to drastically change.  The upper goal, based on 
current GHG contribution, will require a tripling of today’s capacity if a hydrogen 
electrolysis system is included.  The most drastic change is a GHG reduction based on 
U.S. population.  The lower goal will require nearly six times the current capacity by 
2022.  Using an optimistic $2-billion cost figure (assuming savings with standardized 
designs), this amounts to well over a trillion dollars within the next 14 years.FF96FF  How 
                                                 
95  Nuclear Energy Institute, "Comparison of Lifecycle Emissions," Nuclear Energy Institute, 
http://www.nei.org/filefolder/UWM_-_Chart_on_Comparison_of_Life-
Cycle_Emissions.ppt#258,1,Comparison of Life-Cycle Emissions Tons of Carbon Dioxide Equivalent per 
Gigawatt-Hour (accessed September 15, 2008). 
96 Current cost estimate for various plants range from $2.6 - $4.5 billion depending on size and 
location.  Part of these higher price tags come from the custom designs for each plant.  This effort will 
likely require a standardized design and the creation of a streamlined industry. BBC News, "Q&A: The 
Costs of Nuclear Energy," BBC News, sec. Business, January 10, 2008; Shankar Vedantam, "Uncertainties 
Slow Push for Nuclear Plants," Washington Post, sec. Politics, July 24, 2005. 
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significant is this requirement?  The EIA reference case includes macroeconomic 
indicators which plug into its data to build its forecasts.  In the fourteen years leading up 
to the most rigid 2022 deadline, the real investment component of GDP for all of those 
year will total around $31 Trillion.  Government spending will amount to around $30 
million.  A trillion-dollar investment represents over 1.5% of all government spending 
plus all investment in the United States.  This would be 0.5% of the U.S. Real GDP, a 
cost comparable to that currently being attributed to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.FF97FF  
Even if future innovations cut this cost in half, the shift represents a major undertaking.  
As mentioned, Table 6 represents a future using the current mix of reactor types.  Experts 
must also determine whether such a mix is sustainable considering demand for a critical 
resource for nuclear energy, uranium. 
40B40B2.  Nuclear Resource Requirement: Demand and Availability 
Although nuclear power requires many types of resources, uranium is the critical 
component.  Much like oil, uranium is a finite resource the reserves of which are not 
known exactly, but many estimates cause “peak oil”-like concern when projecting energy 
demand into the future.  Figure 6 represents projects the EIA reference case into the 
future with additional predictions based on the U.S. changes required in this study as well 
as a projection based on how demand were to change if the rest or the world went in the 
same direction.  
 
                                                 
97  Jim Lobe, "U.S.-Report: Wars in Iraq, Afghanistan may Cost $3.5 Trillion," Global Information 
Network (November 14, 2007), 1. 
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Figure 6.   Cumulative uranium demand to meet the 450 ppm GHG concentration goal 
shifting 40% energy demand toward nuclear power.  Reserves figures assume a 
$130/kg U extraction cost.FF98 
 
Figure 6 is useful to make a couple of key points.  First, even as estimates of 
reserves may change, the traditional mix of reactors will lead to a serious depletion of 
cheaply accessible uranium before the turn of the century.  In some cases, the supply may 
dry up before the new plants payback the cost of the investment in their construction.  
However, the reserves estimates in Figure 6 are bounded by the economics of uranium 
extraction, and estimates which ignore this constraint have exceeded 35 million tons.  
Such estimates would certainly buy time for nuclear power to make a difference, but part 
of the reason for the economic boundaries is the extra effort to perform the extraction.  
One could imagine that mining hard-to-reach reserves would change the EROI picture 
that warranted the move toward nuclear power in the first place.  As such, the time 
bought by expensive reserves will possibly come at a significant cost in terms of both 
funds and energy. 
                                                 
98  World Nuclear Association, "Supply of Uranium," World Nuclear Association, http://www.world-
nuclear.org/info/inf75.html (accessed September 02, 2008). 
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A search for a better solution leads analysts to the second key point with regard to 
Figure 6.  Instead of using a traditional mix of reactors, one could project demand based 
on the use of Fast Breeder Reactors (FBR).  This reactor type has already been 
constructed in several countries, and more plants are planned.  Two FBR plants are in 
operation today, one in Russia and one in France.FF99FF  Figure 6 provides a projection based 
on FBR reactors handling the load with a uranium demand of one fiftieth the demand 
from traditional reactors.FF100FF  This is possible because a FBR reactor produces fissionable 
plutonium as part of its process.  It produces more fuel than it consumes.   
The use of FBR as part of this study presents a couple of problems.  First, 
although these reactors have been constructed, their lifecycle efficiencies are unknown.  
What EROI value is appropriate for an FBR?  Considering the difficulties with estimating 
traditional reactor types, any value provided today would invite just criticism.  Table 5 
suggests a value of 16 for today’s reactor mix, but this is widely disputed, as recognized 
within the referenced study from which the value was taken.FF101FF  FBR plants are more 
complex but generate less waste.FF102FF  However, as this is a security study, the goal is to 
determine what systems will serve in solving the energy problems, and roughly to what 
degree will they be deployed.  Figure 6 indicates that FBR will be a likely part of any 
nuclear solution, and the analysis should review the security implications of such a move.  
Because these reactors are more complex, they will likely cost more, magnifying the 
investment challenges mentioned earlier. 
In summary, a nuclear push to meet the demands of the various goals in this study 
will involve between 100-600 new nuclear power plants in the United States, a significant 
proportion of which will likely be FBR plants.  The following chapters will examine the 
security dilemmas posed by this change in terms of resource access, nuclear weapons 
proliferation, and infrastructure protection. 
                                                 
99  World Nuclear Association, "Reactor Database," http://www.world-nuclear.org/rd/rdsearch.asp 
(accessed September 03, 2008). 
100  Ibid. 
101  Gagnon, Life Cycle Assessments Confirm the Need for Hydropower and Nuclear Energy, 4. 
102 Bodansky, Nuclear Energy: Principles, Practices, and Prospects, 189. 
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22B22BD. SOLAR FUTURE 
Charting a solar course for the United States will involve a larger variety of 
technologies, more than can be covered in this thesis.  This report will resist the 
temptation to speculate on technologies that are still on the verge of breakthrough to 
technical and commercial feasibility, and focus instead on systems that have a track 
record of performance.  However, some license will be required to map this future, 
because deployment of solar power on the scales required here will demand infrastructure 
solutions that have yet to be proven, namely solutions for energy storage.  Additionally, 
the existing solar energy sources use here represent less than a percent of the current U.S. 
energy production.  Extrapolating these systems to cover the demand required will 
involve much more uncertainty than in the nuclear case, because the required shift in 
scale necessarily incorporates more imponderables, whose consequences cannot be 
realistically anticipated. 
The energy goals set forth in Chapter II provide additional reason to pare down 
the list of solar energy strategies to those technologies that do not involve significant 
GHG emissions.  As such, the following pages will examine a future for solar energy that 
includes Photovoltaic (PV) Solar Cells, Concentrated Solar Power (CSP), and Wind 
Energy.  This assumes the potential for hydro-electricity is fairly tapped out in the U.S. in 
terms of large dam projects.  Bio-fuels have been rejected because of their low EROI 
ratings and comparatively high emissions.  Wave energy is generally untested.  This is 
not to say that there is no potential for these technologies.  It is simply a matter of 
confining analysis in ways that reduce the amount of speculation required,  and so 
keeping the study both credible and manageable. 
The EROI data in Table 5 reflects the performance of solar systems as they plug 
into existing grids without accounting for the need to store energy at night (or when 
winds are low).  On one hand, since solar energy will only make up for a portion of 
energy production using the energy independence or stabilization wedge strategy, one 
could speculate that solar power would handle the daytime energy load, and other power 
sources could handle the load at night.  Although wind energy does not struggle with a 
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day/night cycle as do energy sources derived from direct sunlight, it does come with its 
own cycles of lows and highs, prompting a need for energy storage to promote stable 
service.  Presently, the utility companies do have plants which are designed to service 
peak daytime loads only versus base loads which persist at all hours.FF103FF  Many see solar 
power as a natural fit for peak or intermediate load capacity.FF104FF  Unfortunately, the 
required data to test this potential is not available, a limitation that diminishes the fidelity 
of solar predictions as compared with the nuclear case, but does not hinder this discussion 
on security considerations.  Will peak power capacity concentration completely alleviate 
the need for energy storage?  Certainly not when it comes to transportation demand, a 
sector for which this project has already built a scenario.  But even for electricity, it is 
probably not a safe assumption.  So, if a storage capability is required, how does this 
affect solar’s EROI ratings?  This question is for other research projects to answer.  P. 
Denholm and R. Margolis assume a 75% round trip efficiency for existing storage 
technologies in their computations of per-capita solar footprint requirements for the 
United States for the National Renewable Energy Laboratory.FF105FF  This value is applied to 
solar EROI for a 70% energy storage requirement also provided in the same study.FF106FF  
Because all of these energy sources are intermittent, this analysis will apply a reduction 
factor across the board to solar EROI values of -18%. 
                                                 
103  Energy Information Agency (EIA), "Overview - Generating Capability/Capacity," U.S. 
Department of Energy, http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricity/page/prim2/chapter2.html (accessed 
October 17, 2008). 
104  Bradford, Solar Revolution: The Economic Transformation of the Global Energy Industry, 129. 
105  P. Denholm and R. Margolis, The Regional Per-Capita Solar Electric Footprint for the United 
States (Golden, Colorado: National Renewable Energy Laboratory, 2007). 
106  Ibid. 
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Figure 7.   NREL map showing PV Solar Radiation.FF107FF  U.S. City location added with 
CSP site location from NREL presentation considering several constraints 
restricting site use.FF108 
Another complication with EROI data comes from the need to adjust the power 
grid to accommodate potential concentration of power generation in remote areas for CSP 
and wind power.  Presently, there are 9,351 power plants distributed throughout the 
country.FF109FF  The EROI in Table 5 assumes favorable conditions, which only exist in 
                                                 
107  National Renewable Energy Laboratory, "PV Solar Radiation Map," National Renewable Energy 
Laboratory, http://www.nrel.gov/gis/images/us_pv_annual_may2004.jpg (accessed October 20, 2008). 
108  Mark S. Mehos, "Overview of the 1000 MW CSP Southwest Initiative" (Portland, Oregon, 
National Renewable Energy Laboratory, Solar Thermal Electric International Project Development Forum, 
July 13, 2004). 
109  Energy Information Agency (EIA), "Existing Capacity and Planned Capacity Additions at U.S. 
Electric Utilities by Energy Source, 2000," U.S. Department of Energy, 
http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricity/ipp/html1/t1p01.html (accessed October 17, 2008). 
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certain parts of the country for Wind and CSP.  The CSP figures are based on plants 
constructed in California, Arizona, and Nevada.  The Wind EROI was computed based 
on agreeable wind conditions in the Northeastern United States.  The maps provided in 
Figures 7 and 8 provide a rough approximation of where these favorable conditions are. 
 
Figure 8.   NREL map showing wind resource locations at 50 meter above ground.FF110FF  
EROI figure added from Gagnon study.FF111 
 
To account for the inefficiencies in the rest of the country one can build two 
cases.  First, these systems could be deployed everywhere.  Second, they could be 
deployed where conditions are favorable, and power transmission lines will carry the load 
to the customers along high voltage direct current (HVDC) lines.  HVDC lines lose 3% of 
                                                 
110  National Renewable Energy Laboratory, "United States - Wind Resource Map," National 
Renewable Energy Laboratory, http://www.windpoweringamerica.gov/pdfs/wind_maps/us_windmap.pdf 
(accessed October 20, 2008). 
111  Gagnon, Life Cycle Assessments Confirm the Need for Hydropower and Nuclear Energy, 4. 
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transmitted power per 1,000 km as compared to 8% for traditional AC technology.FF112FF  
The U.S. power grid has been known to suffer total transmission line losses of up to 
4.32% of total delivered power.FF113FF  Consider the hypothetical case where all U.S. power 
might come from CSP locations near those proposed in Figure 7 and wind power 
locations along the coasts where conditions are favorable.  Since wind energy is already 
taxing the existing grid, one might assume such realignment may require the construction 
of new line capacity.FF114FF  Transmitting energy loads to each state may result in a net 
power loss of between 2 and 6% depending on how much of this transmission will occur 
over the existing grid versus HDVC lines.FF115FF  A related problem with this picture is the 
additional grid construction required to make this idea work.  How will this effort be 
reflected in the EROI assumptions?  Unfortunately, there are no available studies that 
even begin to answer this question.  Since these penalties are not as great as those that 
would apply if CSP or wind were deployed in sub-optimal locations, readers can use this 
scenario to construct a defensible, yet optimistic vision for solar power with respect to 





                                                 
112  Asian Development Bank, Guidelines for Estimating Asian Development Bank (ADB) Investments 
in Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency Projects (Manila, Philippines: Asian Development Bank, 
2008), http://www.adb.org/Documents/Clean-Energy/Guidelines-Estimating-ADB-Investments.pdf 
(accessed September 20, 2008). 
113  U.S. Climate Change Technology Program, U.S. Climate Change Technology Program: 
Technology Options for the Near and Long Term (Washington D.C.: U.S. Climate Change Technology 
Program, 2005). 
114   Matthew L. Wald, "Wind Energy Bumps into Power Grid's Limits," New York Times, August 27, 
2008. 
115 This range was computed using a rough comparison of the EIA state breakdown of delivered 
power with a 100-mile line loss on a traditional grid versus a loss over 100-1,500 miles depending on the 
state proximity to a favorable CSP or wind location.  Energy Information Agency (EIA), "State Electricity 
Profiles," U.S. Department of Energy, 
http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricity/st_profiles/e_profiles_sum.html (accessed October 20, 2008). 
 44
To conclude, the EROI figures to include both adjustments for storage (18%) and 
grid changes (5%) are as follows: 
• Solar PV: 8 
• Solar CSP: 56 
• Wind: 23 
The next challenge in drawing this solar picture is the dividing the future power 
load between the three energy types.  To keep this simple, let’s divide the load based on 
EROI and test these proportions against available capacity.  Using EROI, one would 
expect 64% CSP, 27% wind, and 9% PV.  The next question will be to determine 
whether or not these technologies can meet these demands. 
The following sections show the solar power future as divided between the 
different solar technologies to cover each requirement.  Each part includes the specific 
reduction goals as well as demand on key resources.  This analysis examines existing 
plants and products already on the market.  Other technologies may require different 
resources which would alter the resource availability picture depending on which 
technology finally wins out.  Each chart uses a ratio of existing MWe capacity versus 
existing Quad Btu output to extrapolate existing capacity to meet new demand.  As such, 
the numbers include the inefficiencies of today’s alternative energy market.  This would 
be a conservative assumption, but the only reasonable way to build an estimate without 
building scenarios based on unproven technologies or exploratory analysis beyond the 
scope of this study. 
41B41B .  Concentrated Solar Power (CSP) 
CSP plants will provide the lion’s share of power in this strategy due to their 



















 Proportion   64%     
 Adjusted EROI  6.25 56.1     
 Existing Annual U.S. Production   0.030  
20 
millionFF117  
 Energy Independence  10.6 5.9 630  7.9 2030 
 Emission Upper**  19.0 10.6 1,130  14.2 2030 
 Emissions Lower  40.0 22.3 2,379  29.9 2022 
 Addition for Hydrogen Upper  2.0 1.1 119  1.5 2030 
 Additional for Hydrogen Lower  7.0 3.9 416  5.2 2022 
 Total Emissions Upper  21.0 11.7 1,249  15.7 2030 
 Total Emissions Lower  47.0 26.2 2,795  35.1 2022 
      
*Use Existing MWe/Quad Btu Ratio:13,637 
**Wind/CSP GHG Emissions = 2% of fossil fuel emissions so a slight penalty is
applied:FF1181.02 
 
Keep in mind, Table 7 provides a rough estimate of resources for the plant 
capacity only.  To adopt this strategy, U.S. utility companies must implement staggering 
changes to the power grid, the details of which will require further study.  Although grid 
changes represent a significant cost, the impact is not likely to cause a resource shortage, 
or cripple any particular market.  Some solar critics have complained about the need for 
land and glass to make solar power work.FF119FF  These problems do not appear to impede 
CSP as estimated here.  Even the most extreme case requires a land area of less than 3% 
                                                 
116 Used 5 acre/GW planning factor in: Solar Energy Technologies Program, Concentrating Solar 
Power (Golden, CO: National Renewable Energy Laboratory, 2008), 
http://solareis.anl.gov/documents/docs/NREL_CSP_1.pdf (accessed October 7, 2008). 
117  Energy Information Agency (EIA), "Economic Profile and Trends: Glass Industry Analysis 
Brief," U.S. Department of Energy, http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/mecs/iab/glass/page1b.html (accessed 
October 20, 2008). 
118  Nuclear Energy Institute, Comparison of Lifecycle Emissions. 
119  Hayden, The Solar Fraud: Why Solar Energy Won't Run the World, 187-205. 
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of the state of Arizona, one of several states in the southwest that could support such 
plants.  The need for glass in total does not compare to the annual domestic glass 
production in the United States. 
The U.S. Department of Energy indicates that the cost for installed CSP capacity 
is approximately $3-3.5 per Watt.  For the scenarios above costs would range from $300-
1,250 Billion in plant capital construction costs, a sizeable investment even considering 
that the investment can span several years.  This venture will contribute to the sizeable 
solar investment discussed in the GDP review below. 
42B42B .  Wind Power 
Table 8 provides an approximation of wind power requirements.  Land is the key 
resource for this option to work.  Although the land requirements are fairly demanding, 
especially in the case of the lower emissions goal with hydrogen, a couple of factors will 
mitigate this impact.  First, much of this requirement is for the space between turbines, 
which is why the additional column is provided to show actual system footprint.  So, the 
energy independence goal will require around 9,000 square miles, but only 300 square 
miles will consist of the turbines themselves, the rest of the land can be used for other 
purposes provided the uses do not interfere with the flow of air to those turbines.  Second, 
a significant amount of wind energy is available off shore.  This location, although 
expensive to develop, may still prove cost-effective when considering competition with 
other land uses.  Additionally, off shore units can be larger and take advantage of higher 
winds to keep the system active.  Larger units will require less land per unit capacity. 
The concrete and steel requirements to build thousands of wind turbines may 
seem significant, but readers should keep in mind that the figures in the chart are for the 
total construction effort, an effort which should span several years ending in 2022 or 
2030 depending on which goal the U.S. is building toward.  The chart provides the U.S. 
annual production for cement and steel for comparison.  The totals are comparable to an 
annual production figure, but the impact is likely to remain economic, due to production 
capacity, and not a result of depletion of reserves as in the case of oil or uranium.   
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Additionally, many components are recyclable, giving the simpler resource and 
technological demands of wind energy an advantage over more complex solutions or 
those which consume resources permanently. 























 Proportion  27%        
 Adjusted EROI  23.37        
 Existing Annual U.S. 




   
 Energy Independence  2.5  75,000  9,000  300  5.8  3.4 2030
 Emission Upper**  4.5  135,000  16,000  600  10.5  6.1 2030
 Emissions Lower  9.5  284,000  33,000  1,200  22.0  12.9 2022
 Addition for Hydrogen 
Upper  0.5  14,000  2,000  100  1.1  0.6 2030
 Additional for Hydrogen 
Lower  1.7  50,000  6,000  200  3.9  2.3 2022
 Total Emissions Upper  5.0  149,000  17,000  600  11.6  6.8 2030
 Total Emissions Lower  11.2  334,000  38,000  1,300  25.9  15.2 2022
        
*Use Existing MWe/Quad Btu Ratio: 44,627
**Wind/CSP GHG Emissions = 2% of fossil fuel emissions so a slight penalty is applied:FF125 1.02
 
The Department of energy prices wind turbine capacity at around $1,800 kW.FF126FF  
This would drive an investment of between $200-900 Billion to build winds contribution 
to the solar vision.  This does not include land costs or the cost of the grid adjustments to 
                                                 
120 Using the land requirements set forth in the NREL study as a model. National Renewable Energy 
Laboratory, "20% Wind Energy by 2030 Increasing Wind Energy's Contribution to U.S. Electricity 
Supply," U.S. Dept. of Energy, Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy, 10.  
121  Ibid. 
122 Concrete and steel requirement also modeled after NREL study. Ibid., 63. 
123  United States Geological Survey (USGS), "Commodity Statistics and Information," 
http://minerals.usgs.gov/minerals/pubs/commodity/ (accessed October 21, 2008). 
124  Ibid. 
125  Nuclear Energy Institute, Comparison of Lifecycle Emissions. 
126  National Renewable Energy Laboratory, 20% Wind Energy by 2030 Increasing Wind Energy's 
Contribution to U.S. Electricity Supply, 95. 
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support the changed power production structure.  There are a few state level studies 
which indicate that the grid changes will cost between 7-10% of the $1,800/kW 
investment.  Ramping up to a nation-wide scope would increase the transmission line 
requirements, but introduce economy of scale.  Using a 10% factor, this would equate to 
between $20 - 90 Billion in added costs to modify the grid.  Again, as these costs 
accumulate, the bill becomes large enough to impact the U.S. economy as a whole. 
43B43B .  Photovoltaic (PV) Power 
Photovoltaic (PV) cell solutions are the most demanding in terms of resources as 
compared to all of the solar energy components.  Even the 9% allotted to PV is 
comparable to the larger CSP power requirement in terms of land requirement.  This is 
also true in the case of glass despite the thinner glass plating.  Fortunately, most of these 
demands are within the U.S. domestic capabilities for production for both glass and 
silicon, even for the most demanding scenario. 
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Table 9.   Photovoltaic (PV) cell requirements to meet 9% of the reduction goals – power 

















 Proportion  9%      
 Adjusted EROI  8.20      
 Existing Annual U.S. 




 Energy Independence  1.0  90.1  4,000  900,000  20,000  2030
 Emission Upper**  1.8  161.5  7,200  1,600,000  30,000  2030
 Emissions Lower  3.7  339.9  15,100  3,300,000  70,000  2022
 Addition for Hydrogen 
Upper  0.2  17.0  800  200,000  -    2030
 Additional for Hydrogen 
Lower  0.7  59.5  2,600  600,000  10,000  2022
 Total Emissions Upper  2.0  178.5  7,900  1,700,000  40,000  2030
 Total Emissions Lower  4.4  399.4  17,800  3,900,000  80,000  2022
# Single Unit Homes in U.S.: 87,541,000FF
131
   
*Use Existing MWe/Quad Btu Ratio: 20,328 
Solar PV GHG Emissions = 4% of fossil fuel emissions so a slight penalty is applied: 1.04
 
Because of the smaller scale of PV deployment, costs are comparatively low 
when viewed in total.  The 5kW building system currently on the market sells for around 
$36,000.FF132FF  Buying between 4 and 18 million of these kits will cost between $140 and 
650 Billion.  The question is, who pays for these systems?  It may not be reasonable to 
expect 20 million private citizens to spend $36K on their own, even with a $5K subsidy.  
                                                 
127 Land requirements computed as characterized by: Denholm and Margolis, The Regional Per-
Capita Solar Electric Footprint for the United States. 
128 Using Sanyo 5kW system as model with 25 200 W panels to estimate both glass and silicon 
requirements.  System represents a traditional PV system already on the market,  Alter Systems and Sanyo 
Solar, "Sanyo 200 Watt HIT Solar Panel," Alter Systems, http://www.altersystems.com/ (accessed October 
21, 2008). 
129  Energy Information Agency (EIA), Economic Profile and Trends: Glass Industry Analysis Brief. 
130  United States Geological Survey (USGS), Commodity Statistics and Information. 
131  U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, American Housing Survey for the United 
States: 2007 (Washington D.C.: U.S. Department of Housing, U.S. Department of Commerce, 2008), 
http://www.census.gov/prod/2008pubs/h150-07.pdf (accessed October 22, 2008). 
132  Alter Systems and Sanyo Solar, Sanyo 200 Watt HIT Solar Panel. 
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If the government funds these installations completely, how will it oversee their 
maintenance, prevent neglect, or ensure the systems are not abused or sold?  One 
advantage is lower demand on the power grid system, when compared to the significant 
changes required by the CSP and wind options. 
In summary, the solar future, as required by the goals set forth in this study, 
represents a substantial departure from today’s energy system.  The power grid of today, 
fed by over 9,000 plants of various shapes and sizes, will be replaced by a massive 
concentration of power capacity in the southwestern desert, thousands of wind turbines, 
and PV systems to be mounted on millions of buildings across the nation.  The power 
grid will require significant investment to realign to new concentrations of power 
production.  A storage capacity will be required to handle the energy requirements when 
solar energy is unavailable, and some plant capacity will likely be required to provide a 
baseline power platform immune from solar and wind interruption. 
From the least to the most ambition goals, the U.S. economy would need to 
support between $700-3,000 Billion in capital costs between now and 2030 (applying a 
10% cost to CSP and wind costs for grid adjustments).  This investment represents 
between 0.3-1.5% of the U.S. Real GDP without accounting for the cost of operation and 
maintenance, land acquisition, and energy storage systems.  Does this investment mean 
these options are not feasible?  There are a few reasons to suggest this may not be enough 
of a barrier to dismiss a solar future as a possibility.  First, as mentioned before, the 
investment of 1% of a nation’s GDP is comparable to the cost of the present wars in Iraq 
and Afghanistan.FF133FF  Some would say that these are wars the U.S. cannot afford due to 
current economic challenges facing the country.  However, it may still be safe to claim 
that if the U.S. can afford a war, it can afford alternative energy.  Solar pessimists when 
examining cost figures frequently forget that these investments yield significant benefits 
which may outweigh the costs.  As the industry matures, prices will likely go down as 
providers at all levels become more efficient.  There is no telling how many other 
                                                 
133  Robert J. Barro, "Why the War Against Terror Will Boost the Economy," Business Week, no. 
3756 (November 5, 2001), 30, 
http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=87509466&Fmt=7&clientId=65345&RQT=309&VName=PQD. 
 51
benefits will come about as this technology grows.  Additionally, there are the costs of 
not taking action, costs which may dwarf these investment figures especially if climate 
change predictions come to pass.  Finally, remember that the goal for energy 
independence is to reduce the costs of oil dependence to below 1% of GDP.  Once solar 


















3B3BIV. RESOURCE ACCESS  
23B23BA. THE ACCESS QUESTION 
Solar and nuclear energy each come with a unique stratum of resource demands.  
The security problems associated with these demands have to do with the availability of 
resources to meet this demand, how these resources are controlled, and which countries 
exercise this control.  This dialogue will chiefly center on the most demanding goal for 
these options, that is the energy shift required to support a GHG reduction goal based on 
U.S. share of population.  The following paragraphs will focus on answering the 
questions: will the shift toward nuclear or solar energy resolve the dilemmas of the status 
quo; or will problems persist changing nothing more than the resource?  The potential 
crisis with fossil-fuel-based energy include three general concerns.  First, market 
consolidation within the oil market conveys disproportionate power to nations whose 
interests may conflict with those of the United States and its closest allies, all of which 
are major net importers of petroleum.  Second, control over energy resources by 
governments known for corrupt or arbitrary behavior may lead to at best an unpredictable 
energy market, or at worst, a market driven by state actors that use their reserves to 
manipulate the energy market for political gain.  Finally, the fossil-fuel industry drives a 
need to engage with governments abroad to secure energy resources, creating an 
economic dependency on other governments in competition with other fossil-fuel-
consuming nations, a recipe for conflict.  Ideally, the resource demands of a new energy 
system will involve a non-consolidated market, free from monopolistic or oligopolistic 
control.  Resources should be available from nations with stable governments.  Finally, 
the best solution will not require Carter-Doctrine-like protection abroad thus freeing the 
United States from complicated security arrangements with questionable allies and 
relieving the competitive struggle with other energy-consuming nations. 
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24B24B . SOLAR RESOURCES 
Chapter III provided a scenario for resource demands to support the energy policy 
shifts required for each energy goal.  Resources to make these changes involve land, 
glass, silicon, and various construction materials, as well as a massive amount of funding 
(over $3 Trillion for the most ambitious goal).  Although other resources, such as rare 
metals for PV cells, may cause a future resource concern (depending on the technology 
that wins out) none of these problems resemble oil as a limited resource. 
44B44B1. Solar Land 
Of all of the resources required for solar power, land is perhaps the one in shortest 
supply.  To make the solar strategy work for the most aggressive goal, CSP will require 
around 2,800 square miles of desert land, wind energy will require over 38,000 square 
miles in wind-friendly territory along the coasts and throughout the central plains, and PV 
panels will take up over 400 square miles on the rooftops of over 20,000,000 buildings.  
Wind commands the greatest claim for land requiring over 1% of the 3.5 million square 
miles available land in the United States.  However, from this 1% one could subtract all 
offshore turbines, which may provide a significant portion of this requirement.  
Additionally, the actual infrastructure footprint will be much smaller as most of the land 
will be required to provide proper spacing between turbines.  In the end, the required land 
is in the United States, and as such, there is little in the way of foreign control over this 
asset to the degree that foreign interests control oil or other fossil fuels.  Therefore the 
challenge is in economics, not security, when considering access to land. 
45B45B2. Solar Raw Materials 
Solar’s need for raw materials is massive in market terms, but there is no question 
of resource depletion, merely of production capacity.  Reserves of silicon, the most 
challenging resource problem relative to current (very modest) market requirements, are 
not even estimated.FF134FF  If solar cell technology requires the use of rare earth elements 
                                                 
134  United States Geological Survey (USGS), Commodity Statistics and Information. 
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this picture would change, as in the case of thin-film PV technology.FF135FF  Many of these 
rare elements are extracted as part of the mining operations of other elements such as 
copper, lead, or zinc.FF136FF  These mining operations can be subject to the same problems 
with resource nationalism as fossil fuels, though on a smaller scale due to a more diverse 
network. Battery technology for energy storage will present a similar challenge 
depending on which battery technology survives the test of time in the hybrid/electric 
vehicle market. 
46B46B3. Solar Market Consolidation 
The small scale of solar industry makes comparison with fossil fuels or even 
nuclear energy markets difficult.  The numbers of companies involved are few, and 
predicting vulnerability to monopolistic control as the industry matures requires too much 
uncertainty to be useful.  However, a couple of general points can provide some 
perspective.  The challenges of today are such that analysts measure the health of the 
industry in terms of the behaviors of individual companies, and their ability to cope with 
material shortages, market volatility, and changes in production methods. There is no 
speculation about resource nationalism in relation to silicon, glass, concrete, or steel , as 
there is for the oil or uranium markets.  Consider the PV cell market case.  Because 
materials for both wind and CSP projects are readily available, PV cell production 
presents the most challenging dilemma with regard to market consolidation.  The handful 
of companies which produce these cells are exhausting the current supply of solar grade 
silicon, which mostly derives from the high-grade scrap created by integrated circuit 
production. Silicon providers are accordingly beginning to provide dedicated production 
to support this market, which has now grown to match the silicon demand of 
semiconductor manufacturing.FF137FF   
                                                 
135  Jack Lifton, "Thin-Film Solar Cells, Other than those which use A Form of Silicon, are Not 
Practical due to Natural Resource Limitations," The Expert Network, September 17, 2008, 
http://www.glgroup.com/News/Thin-Film-Solar-Cells-Other-Than-Those-Which-Use-A-Form-of-Silicon-
Are-Not-Practical-Due-To-Natural-Resource-Limitati-27898.html (accessed November 5, 2008). 
136  Jack Lifton, "Solar Energy, the Underground Source," The Resource Investor (September 12, 
2008, 2008), http://www.resourceinvestor.com/pebble.asp?relid=46003 (accessed November 5, 2008). 
137  John Carey, "What's Raining on Solar's Parade," Business Week, no. 3970 (February 6, 2006), 78. 
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If there is a market consolidation conversation with regard to PV, it is one about 
private companies, and not about governments.  The production of solar cells is 
dominated by companies which have the technical ability to manufacture cells.  These 
companies are concentrated within the advanced economies of Europe (26%), the United 
States (9%) and Japan (47%).FF138FF  Although this concentration may suggest the Japan is 
in the position to exert OPEC-like power over the system, let’s not forget that this 
discussion is generally about private company participation in a free market.FF139FF  The 
smaller U.S. market share is due in part to a lack of domestic demand or interest, and not 
due to the lack of capability or access to resources.  The United States can grow an 
industry to support any market because the required resources are at hand within the 
country.  Japan’s prominence in PV production does not provide the same leverage 
enjoyed by oil producing nations.  This is not to say that governments do not play an 
important role.  Government-sponsored research, subsidies, and grants have been an 
integral part of the growth of solar industry on all fronts.  As important as these roles may 
be, they do not rise to the level of resource nationalism.  This dampens the strategic 
concern with market consolidation in the PV case as compared to the status quo, an 
energy market known to facilitate conflict on a national scale, playing a role in both 
World Wars.FF140 
47B47B . Solar State Control 
Because the markets involved with solar energy are either more diverse or much 
smaller than the case with fossil fuels, state manipulation within solar markets does not 
represent the same challenge.  Even in the more restrictive PV industry, no state can 
control the raw material because silicon is everywhere.  Chapter II’s table examining the 
governance of countries which control the fossil fuel industry would need to be expanded 
                                                 
138  Arnulf Jäger-Waldau, PV Status Report 2006: Research, Solar Cell Production, and Market 
Implementation of Photovoltaics (Ispra, Italy: European Commission DG Joint Research Centre, 2006). 
139  Ibid. 
140  Daniel Moran, "The Battlefield and the Marketplace: Two Cautionary Tales" In Energy Security 
and Global Politics: The Militarization of Resource Management, eds. Daniel Moran and James A. Russell 
(London; New York: Rutledge, 2009), 19-38. 
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to include all nations.  At any rate, in the PV case the countries which do enjoy large 
market share, such as the United States, Japan, or Europe, would score comparatively 
well using the governance measures in Chapter II. 
48B48B5. Solar Security Abroad 
Because the United States has access to nearly all of the components to produce 
solar power, there is no need for a Carter-Doctrine-like security arrangement to safeguard 
energy resources.  Although this picture may change for rare-earth requirements, the 
diversity of solar technology options would diminish this effect. 
In summary, there is some uncertainty as to solar resources, but there is also no 
clear-cut reserve depletion problem resembling the fossil fuel challenge of the present.  
As such, solar energy offers an improvement to the U.S. security posture as compared to 
the status quo.  Because of the varied methods of production and the availability of most 
of the resources from domestic sources, the United States may be able to reduce its 
protective footprint abroad and concentrate on other security challenges. 
25B25BC. NUCLEAR RESOURCES 
The nuclear resource question is more directly comparable to the fossil fuel case 
due to the finite nature of nuclear resources and the control of these resources, and 
specifically uranium, by a few key states.   
49B49B1. Uranium 
Uranium is the primary fuel for nuclear power as provided by nature.  Natural 
uranium typically contains two main isotopes: 235U (0.7%, by mass) and 238U 
(99.3%).FF141FF  Because most traditional reactors use 235U as the primary fissile nucleotide, 
there is a need to enrich the concentration of 235U above what is typically mined, typically 
to between two and four percent.FF142FF  Most reactors (including all those in the U.S.) 
                                                 
141  Bodansky, Nuclear Energy: Principles, Practices, and Prospects, 199. 
142  Ibid., 199. 
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utilize 235U “once-through” fuel cycle, where 235U is used as a fuel, and all remaining 
post-reaction materials are treated as waste.FF143FF  As indicated in Chapter III, any move 
toward nuclear energy to the degree required by the more demanding goals in this study 
would require a departure from this fuel cycle.  Of these many methods of recycling or 
producing nuclear fuel, the most promising involve the use of breeder reactors.  This is 
the technology which provides the improvement of fuel consumption by a factor of fifty 
as discussed in the previous chapters.  This is achieved in a fast breeder reactor (FBR) by 
using both plutonium (239Pu, produced in another uranium reactor) and 238U to provide 
power while breeding more 239Pu to sustain the reaction (more 239Pu is generated than 
initially consumed).FF144FF  Whatever the method, one can safely assume that the 
management of uranium will remain a strategic challenge until demand is such that 
control of uranium reserves is of little concern. 
50B50B2. Nuclear Market Consolidation 
Today’s mix of reactors demand more uranium that the FBR mix required by this 
push toward nuclear energy.  As such, analysts should address the uranium market as a 
highly competitive strategic concern, at least until FBR technology reduces demand such 
that domestic reserves could last for the foreseeable future.  Therefore, security strategists 
must handle the question of who controls the reserves of uranium, just as they must 
consider who controls oil reserves. 
 
                                                 
143  Bodansky, Nuclear Energy: Principles, Practices, and Prospects, 194. 
144  Ibid., 188-189. 
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Table 10.   2007 Uranium Reserves and Production – Top 15 
 Uranium 
ReservesFF145 
  Uranium Production from 
MinesFF146 
 Country tons U Rank % tons U Rank % 
Australia  1,243,000 1 23 8,611 2 21 
Kazakhstan  817,000 2 15 6,637 3 16 
Russia  546,000 3 10 3,413 4 8 
South Africa  435,000 4 8 539 11 1 
Canada  423,000 5 8 9,476 1 23 
United States  342,000 6 6 1,654 8 4 
Brazil  278,000 7 5 299 13 1 
Namibia  275,000 8 5 2,879 6 7 
Niger  274,000 9 5 3,153 5 8 
Ukraine  200,000 10 4 846 9 2 
Jordan  112,000 11 2 --  -- -- 
Uzbekistan  111,000 12 2 2,320 7 6 
India  73,000 13 1 270 14 1 
China  68,000 14 1 712 10 2 
Mongolia  62,000 15 1 -- -- -- 
Rest of World 210,000   4 470   1 
Total 5,469,000.00   41,279    
 
Table 10 is the uranium counterpart to the oil reserve chart in Chapter II.  
Although the mix of countries are different, there is some similarity with respect to the 
disparity in reserves control, and the middle-of-the-pack position of the United States in 
the rank order of control.  There are a couple of potential advantages for the United States 
with respect to nuclear power.  First of all, the U.S. share of the total reserves is larger 
than in the case of oil by a factor of three.  Second, if breeder technology is implemented 
as proposed in Chapter III (Figure 1) the U.S. reserves may last a very long time.  In 
addition, the uranium market is not as developed as the oil market.  Additional 
discoveries are likely, which might change the structure of this chart considerably. 
                                                 
145 Reserves figures from WNA are at an extraction cost of $130/kg U.  World Nuclear Association, 
Supply of Uranium. 
146  World Nuclear Association, "World Uranium Mining," World Nuclear Association, 
http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/inf23.html?terms=uranium+production (accessed September 02, 2008). 
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To compare the market consolidation in the uranium market to the status quo, 
Figure1 provides the same measures as provided in the oil discussion using a rather 
extreme forecast omitting savings from FBR implementation.  This chart assumes a 5% 
shift in nuclear fuel demand in line with the more aggressive scenarios for nuclear energy 
without breeder technology.   
 
Figure 9.   HHI computation for the World Uranium Market.  Based on World Nuclear 
Association 2008  Figures, assuming a 5% increase in annual demand with NO 
BREEDER REACTORS.  All countries are treated as independent actors. 
 
At first glance one could conclude that the similarity between Figure 9 and the 
same graph for oil would indicate that both options suffer the same vulnerability.  Before 
drawing such conclusions, one should consider that limitations of this prediction are the 
same as those listed in Chapter II for the oil diagram. The chart also neglects the 
influence of FBR implementation, a required feature for the shift to take place to achieve 
the study goals.  With breeder reactors, demand would go down, and the upward trends in 
this chart would stay level, a position which would indicate a “Moderately Concentrated” 
market.  However, even this characterization would overstate the effect of consolidation.  
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If demand is reduced to a negligible level as compared to reserves, the U.S. market need 
only consider outside sources if they can provide nuclear fuel cheaper that it can provide 
for itself domestically.  It becomes an economic concern, beneath the level of national 
strategy as long as the effects are strictly market driven.   
51B51B3. Nuclear State Control 
Despite the reduced concern with state control, Table 2 provides a comparison of 
the different nations economic and governance indicators to echo the similar table 





























Australia 909  13% 43,163 8.7 0.96 1 1 
Kazakhstan 105  7% 10,837 2.6 0.79 no data no data 
Russia 1,290 6% 14,704 2.5 0.80 6 5 
South Africa 283 24% 9,767 4.9 0.67 2 2 
Canada 1,436  6% 38,614 8.5 0.96 1 1 
United States 13,807  5% 45,725 7.3 0.95 1 1 
Brazil 1,314 9% 9,703 3.5 0.80 2 2 
Namibia 7 5% 5,250 4.5 0.65 2 2 
Niger 4 no data 667 2.8 0.37 3 4 
Ukraine  142 7% 6,968 2.5 0.79 3 2 
Jordan  16 13.5% 4,906 5.1 0.77 5 4 
Uzbekistan  22 0.8% 2,389 1.8 0.70 7 7 
India  1,100 25% 2,563 3.4 0.62 2 3 
China 3,308  4% 5,325 3.3 0.78 7 6 
Mongolia 4  4% 3,222 3.0 0.70 2 2 
Most Favorable Score 10 1 1 1 
Least Favorable Score 0 0 7 7 
 
As might be expected, there are similarities with the oil reserve measurement.  Six 
countries are on both lists, and the ratings include both favorable and unfavorable scores 
both in terms of economy and governance.  However, the scores are generally more 
favorable than in the oil case.  Of the four index scores, the favorable scores are roughly  
 
 
                                                 
147 Data from country profiles compiled from International Monetary fund data for 2007.  
International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database, October 2008. 
148 Data from CIA fact book.  Differing fiscal years for some countries was used when consistent 
information was not available.  Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook. 
149 Data from country profiles compiled from the International Monetary Fund data for 2007.  Values  
in Current International Dollars.  International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database, 
October 2008. 
150  Transparency International, CPI Table. 
151  United Nations Development Programme, "United Nations Human Development Report," 
Palgrave Macmillan, http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/ (accessed March 25, 2008). 
152  Freedom House, Map of Freedom in the World. 
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equal in number to the negative ones.  Even discounting the HDI rating which includes 
GDP, the good scores outnumber the poor ones, a marked improvement over the situation 
with fossil fuels. 
52B52B4. Nuclear Security Abroad 
If breeder technology is employ to reduce uranium demand the change to nuclear 
should diminish the need for taxing security arrangements abroad.  As mentioned, the 
United States has three times the reserve share as in the oil case, and demand can be 
significantly reduced using the necessary breeder reactors.  This is not to say that there 
will be no requirement for market protection, merely that this need will more directly 
compare to the generalized protection the United States provides for other commercial 
markets, which do not carry the strategic value of the fossil fuel trade.  On the other hand, 
uranium presents a more focused security target than in the solar case, which requires a 
much more diverse set of resources to function.   
Nuclear resource access, although similar to the fossil fuel case, represents a 
significant improvement over oil in terms of market consolidation, state control, and 
security overseas. This improvement, however, is tied to a change in the industry to 
include the use of breeder reactors, a move with a different set of security implications 
with regard to nuclear weapons proliferation covered in the next chapter. 
26B26BD. SUMMARY 
Both solar and nuclear shifts provide a noteworthy improvement to the security 
position of the United States as compared to the fossil fuel energy industry.  Solar 
benefits from a broad range of relatively accessible resources not vulnerable to state 
manipulation or control.  The uranium market is more advantageous for the United States 
because of reduced demand, greater U.S. share of reserves, and an improvement in 
governance scores for states which possess the larger shares of uranium reserves.  
However, both improvements are conditional.  The solar energy market should restrict 
reliance on rare earth elements, preventing the management of such resources to become 
strategic in nature.  Without breeder technology, or similar fuel production or recycling 
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technique, the uranium reserve problem may match the concern with fossil fuels in time.  
Accepting the conditions which lead to these security improvements, solar energy is the 
more attractive option using this criteria, because of the diversity of resources outside 
strict state control and easier access. 
 65
4B4BV. NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROLIFERATION  
27B27BA. NUCLEAR WEAPON QUESTION 
The impact of nuclear weapons proliferation varies with the different nuclear 
futures proposed in this study.  As might be expected, the most dramatic scenario 
involves the massive shift toward nuclear power as in the case of the more aggressive 
GHG reduction goals.  Although, readers may consider the security for the lesser goals a 
matter of degree in comparison to the extreme cases, accepting that a shift without FBR 
implementation would effectively dodge a new set of challenges covered below. In any 
case, the following narrative is chiefly concerned with the more assertive nuclear future, 
one which requires FBR.  The chief security interest is the possibility of nuclear weapons 
in the hands of terrorists, arguably the most severe homeland security scenario 
imaginable today.  The following account assumes that increased nuclear weapons 
proliferation would increase the possibility for terrorist access to such weapons, at least 
indirectly.  A significant increase in the size of the nuclear power industry would require 
an equivalent in growth of the number of personnel, markets, and technology to support 
it, potentially multiplying avenues of access to nuclear material.  In addition, FBR plants 
generate plutonium suitable for use in a weapon. 
28B28B . INCENTIVES FOR NUCLEAR WEAPONS 
To envisage how states will decide their nuclear weapons future, one can begin 
with an examination of pertinent incentives.  Mitchell B. Reiss provides a useful list of 
incentives and disincentives for governments as they consider building nuclear bombs.  
His work is part of a collaborative effort between the Center for Strategic and 
International Studies and the Reves Center for International Studies at the College of 
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William and Mary to address recent changes in nuclear weapons proliferation.FF153FF These 
incentive and disincentives are provided in Table 11.   
Table 11.    Reiss list of state incentives for nuclear weapons programsFF154 
Incentive Disincentive 
- Intimidate and coerce rivals 
- Enhanced security vs. rivals 
- Status and prestige 
- Domestic politics 
- Self aggrandizement  
- Cost 
- Technical difficulty 
- Domestic opposition 
- Damage to international relations 
- Alliances 
- Non-proliferation norms 
 
Considering the security environment of today and the near future, the experts in 
the study suggest that there are five factors that can drive a country with no nuclear 
weapons to reverse course.  These factors include: FF155FF  
• U.S. foreign and security policy 
• The status of the global non-proliferation movement 
• Changes in global or regional security 
• Domestic politics 
• Availability of technology 
How will the shift toward nuclear power change this picture?  The nuclear 
scenarios considered here have inherent features with respect to the technology question 
that may lead to some useful conclusions with respect to the increased availability of 
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technology and how this would change the incentives in terms of cost, technical 
difficulty, status, non-proliferation regime, and national security. 
29B29BC. NUCLEAR POWER PROLIFERATION 
A four-fold increase in the size of the nuclear power industry by 2030, as required 
in the most demanding GHG goal, would represent a substantial expansion of the nuclear 
workforce, dedicated resources, and a reinvigoration of nuclear-related academic 
research. More students, more engineers and scientists, and more technicians may yield 
innovations leading to more efficient plant designs, reasonable standards, and streamlined 
regulatory processes, all changes driven by the economic necessities of the new power 
industry structure.   
Plutonium is a key component of this discussion, as its production is drastically 
affected by the nuclear power shift.  This change is specific to the civilian nuclear power 
industry transformation, because the uranium enrichment pathway to nuclear weapons 
would exist with or without an extraordinary multiplication of civilian nuclear power 
plants.   It is generally understood that all reactors can potentially be used to generate 
plutonium for nuclear weapons.FF156FF  Fissile plutonium (239Pu) is a byproduct of most 
nuclear processes, as it is generated any time 238U absorbs an additional neutron as part of 
235U fission.  Use of plutonium in weapons is a matter of removing the other 
contaminates from the 239Pu present in the post-reaction waste products, to create an ideal 
concentration of around 90% 239Pu (although as little as 70% could possibly be used in a 
bomb).FF157FF  Frank Barnaby, a long-time nuclear expert with the Oxford Research Group, 
computed a theoretical measure of plutonium available for weapons programs from 
civilian nuclear energy production and determined that these programs could potentially 
provide 265 grams of 239Pu for each MWe power capacity provided, generating enough 
material for a 20 kiloton bomb for each 40MWe (the Hiroshima bomb has been estimated 
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at 20 kilotons).FF158FF  This would mean that today there is enough 239Pu produced to 
generate over 9,000 such bombs from the world’s 360,000 MWe nuclear power capacity 
tracked as operational in the WNA database.FF159FF  The most extreme nuclear future in this 
study will provide plutonium for another 40,000 bombs annually, if the world adopts the 
same increased nuclear energy policy as the United States, even without the increased 
239Pu from FBR plants.  On the other hand, this fact alone has not led to a significant 
increase in the number of countries which possess nuclear weapons programs, 
presumably because of the other factors and incentives referenced earlier. Historically, 
nuclear power programs have not been an especially prominent proliferation pathway. 
The technical barrier to plutonium bomb production is significant.  The 
reprocessing technology used to generate weapons grade plutonium from spent nuclear 
fuel is rarely developed independently.FF160FF  However, this barrier has not completely 
prevented nations from developing a weapons program when motivated to do so.  India 
provides a useful historic example.  India’s weapons program began with a research 
heavy-water reactor and the plutonium reprocessing capabilities which followed.FF161FF  
Both systems are justifiable for use in civilian power production, but in the India case, 
they were also used to create a nuclear weapons program in the 1990s.   
It is reasonable to suggest that a four-fold increase in the size of the nuclear 
industry will substantially reduce these technical barriers, both in terms of access to the 
required expertise as well as cost.  The proliferation risk associated with nuclear power 
plants is commonly diffused by the claim that plutonium recovery is a tedious route 
toward the development of a nuclear weapon, and that proliferation along the uranium 
enrichment path would more likely occur, with or without civilian power programs, for 
sufficiently motivated governments.FF162FF  However, those who make such arguments 
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typically do not envision a nuclear industry as large as required in this study, which 
produces unprecedented amounts of 239Pu with an unprecedented number of opportunities 
for such material to slip through the cracks.FF163FF  Today, as much as 1% of these materials 
goes unaccounted for.FF164FF  Additionally, in a world awash with plutonium production 
capacity, hiding a nuclear weapons program becomes that much easier for countries 
without access to domestic uranium reserves.  This would allow a country to escape 
detection until it is too late for the international community to respond.  The 
responsibility of securing uranium and plutonium materials is a necessary feature even 
for pro-nuclear advocates.  Part of this security is in the high the cost of secrecy, a cost 
substantially reduced with widespread access to plutonium.  The tasks required to protect 
uranium and plutonium grow to potentially unmanageable levels under this scenario, 
even before the FBR feature of this nuclear future is taken into account.    
30B30BD. FAST BREEDER REACTOR 
A critical component of the highest energy transformation goal is use of FBR 
plants to support the country’s energy demands.  As discussed, these reactors extend the 
life of uranium reserves well into the foreseeable future while generating less waste, even 
as demand rises to unprecedented levels.  Although this would represent a substantial 
improvement to energy security with respect to access, FBR plants magnify the 
plutonium problem emphasized in the previous section. 
As mentioned, civilian energy programs are not necessarily the most efficient way 
to produce weapons-grade fissionable material, but it is an option, especially in the case 
of FBR deployment.  The potential role for FBR in a nuclear weapons program was a key 
factor in the Carter administration’s decision to abandon FBR development programs in 
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the United States in the late 1970s.FF165FF  FBR adds to the 239Pu problems in two ways.  
First, FBR plants produce more nuclear fuel than they consume, compared to traditional 
reactors which generate waste 239Pu amounting to around one third the uranium fuel used 
in the process.FF166FF  However, a three-fold increase in the amount of plutonium within the 
confines of FBR plants does not necessarily equal a three-fold increase in security 
requirements because the number of sites requiring this security remains the same.  The 
second problem with FBRs is the weapons-grade quality of the 239Pu within the breeder 
blankets, which eliminates the need for continued reprocessing.FF167FF  Thus, FBR 
deployment may reduce the need for the development of separate reprocessing plant 
technology. 
31B31BE. CONCLUSIONS 
Implementation of an energy policy shift of the magnitude required by the energy 
goals in this study reduces two of the six disincentives to the development of nuclear 
weapons programs, cost and technical difficulty.  For review, the five factors which may 
trigger a policy reversal toward nuclear weapons development include: U.S. foreign or 
security policy, status of the non-proliferation movement, regional or global security, 
domestic politics, and access to technology.  When considering these factors, the nuclear 
future as proposed here would shift the availability of technology in favor of a program.  
Additionally, the creation of a plutonium fuel cycle with over seven-times the amount of 
plutonium available for weapons programs would present a new security challenge which 
increases the likelihood of terrorist access to nuclear material.  This may have a profound 
effect on the non-proliferation regime if it becomes overwhelmed by the need to manage 
unprecedented levels of nuclear material.  Such a course of events would weaken the 
regime’s legitimacy, and proliferation may be perceived as inevitable.  Such a perception 
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would encourage the building of nuclear arsenal.  Whether or not a government would 
choose to make such a move would depend on the other factors, which points to a need 
for the U.S. to influence those factors to limit proliferation. 
As mentioned, there are those who would suggest that uranium presents a more 
attractive option for a weapons program, and that the changes above would not affect this 
generalization.  As such, one could dismiss the concern and treat the proliferation 
question as the same for both the solar and nuclear power options.  Solar power does not 
prevent uranium enrichment, but it does not require a massive growth in an industry 
which would provide the same technologies and expertise as a nuclear weapons program.  
When considering how little material is required to build a bomb, and the extreme 
consequences if such a bomb were to fall into the hands of terrorists, even a small 
increase in the likelihood may prove unacceptable.FF168 
The greatest hope in this scenario may come from the new research focus on 
nuclear technology potentially leading to a search for solutions which could provide for a 
breeder cycle which does not produce weapons grade material.  Advances in detection, 
control, forensics, and response are all possibilities which may counter the proliferation 
threat to some extent.  However, considering the consequences of failure, reliance on a 
research promise seems irresponsible. 
 
                                                 
















5B5BVI.  INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION 
32B32BA. CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION 
The final aspect of security as part of these proposed energy changes is the 
protection of the infrastructure itself.  Each energy future provides different outcomes 
with respect to network security, hardening requirements, and resilience.  What follows is 
an examination of both the nuclear and solar cases as represented by the potential futures 
outlined in Chapter III.  As with previous discussion, the focus below will address how 
the infrastructure changes with each option, limiting discussion of broader questions that 
would apply to any energy future, including the status quo. 
Before dividing the analysis into each alternative future, readers should 
understand the proposed approach to critical infrastructure protection (CIP).  First, is an 
examination of the infrastructure network security.  The narrative will apply Ted Lewis’ 
textbook approach to general questions with regard to the power networks required in 
each case.FF169FF  As mentioned, the characterization of the infrastructure system as a system 
of nodes and links it the foundation of this analysis, as failures are modeled within 
different nodes or links to evaluate the systems ability to recover from such attacks or 
propagate failures to different parts of the network.  Nodes in the power grid would 
include power plants, substations, and end-use facilities such as buildings, industrial 
complexes or homes.  Links would include the 150,000-plus miles of power transmission 
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Figure 10.   Simple representation of nodes and links in the electrical power infrastructure 
network.FF170FF   
Lewis’ assessment of the electrical power grid includes a few useful observations 
which can translate to the discussion of both solar and nuclear options.  A few relevant 
observations are quoted as follows:FF171 
a. There is no shortage of power, but there is a shortage of 
distribution capacity 
b. The “Architecture” of the grid is a small-world network-clustered 
nodes connected to other clustered nodes through a combination of 
many short and a few long links. 
c. Because of the small-world architecture of the grid, and the laws of 
physics, the grid is vulnerable to cascade effects that can sweep 
through the power grid interconnects like a contagion sweeps 
through human populations. 
d. The greatest vulnerabilities exist “in the middle,” That is, in the 
transmission and distribution layer of the power grid. 
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e. No single power generator is critical-the largest power source 
provides less than 1% of the national capacity. 
These five factors will serve as benchmarks in the following discussion as each 
energy future affects them in different ways.  Will the new energy future improve the 
security challenges with respect to network structure? 
Although plant security is part of the network security question, it does warrant 
additional consideration beyond network analysis.  This has to do with the attractiveness 
of the plant as a target for terrorist attack, and the capabilities that can be provided to 
secure these plants.  Does the new security solution provide better targets for terrorists?  
Are these assets protectable? 
Finally, there is the matter of network resilience.  This involves investigating how 
the system would recover from failure.  As discussed, hardening of the entire system 
against a vast array of unpredictable threats is probably not affordable, but taking 
measures to improve network resilience are attractive for both security and economics.  
For the power grid, resilient strategies have included: building redundant links; proposing 
a smarter network, more resistant to cascading failures;FF172FF or bolstering emergency 
response capabilities.FF173FF  These measures would pay off for any type of failure path, both 
natural and man-made, contrasting with protective hardening measures such as physical 
barriers or security forces that chiefly prevent man-made threats.  How will the proposed 
changes in energy policy affect the picture with respect to resilience?  Will the new path 
lead to a fragile or flexible network? 
 
 
                                                 
172  Massoud Amin, "Toward Self-Healing Infrastructure Systems," Computer 33, no. 8 (Aug, 2000), 
44, http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=58512312&Fmt=7&clientId=65345&RQT=309&VName=PQD. 
173 Anna K. Schwab, David J. Brower and Katherine Eschelbac, Hazard Mitigation and 
Preparedness: Building Resilient Communities (Hoboken, NJ: J. Wiley, 2007), 568. 
 76
33B33B .  NUCLEAR INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION 
As mentioned, the nuclear future will require 100-600 nuclear plants to replace 
fossil fuel plants within the U.S. inventory of over 9,250 existing non-nuclear power 
plants for the most part owned and secured by private industry.  Although this change 
does represent some consolidation in terms of production, for the most part, this analysis 
assumes these changes should pose no new problem for the existing power grid as a 
whole, beyond local adjustments.   
53B53B1. Network Security 
The nuclear future involves plugging now plants to the power grid and taking a 
larger number of fossil fuel plants off line.  Although this does reduce the number of 
power producing nodes, the small world character of the middle of the network will 
remain unaffected.  One could create a nuclear version of Figure 10 just by replacing all 
plant icons with nuclear symbols.  This would suggest that Lewis’s five network security 
observations will likely hold true for the nuclear network.  This is not to say that the 
network will behave exactly the same.  Lewis’ points out that no single power source 
provides 1% of the energy supply carries more weight with the current system of 9,000 
plus plants than a nuclear future with around 600 FBR facilities. 
The similarities end when the energy network is extended to consider the supply 
of fuel to keep the plants running.  Today’s plants are fed oil and natural gas though a 
system of pipelines resembling another small world network, and a fed coal through the 
country’s rail and road networks.FF174FF  These networks are generally owned and secured 
by private industry.  Although the pipeline systems are seen as potential targets, the 
system has yet to be subject to attack in the United States.  The American Petroleum 
Institute, in conjunction with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), has 
developed security guidelines with a focus on intelligence, planning, communications, 
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and risk assessment.FF175FF  There is no wide-spread effort to secure these assets by the 
federal government.  Although, there are rigid regulatory requirements for the transport 
of nuclear material, the security of materials in transit remains in the hands of private 
entities.FF176FF  Although the implementation of the proposed nuclear future would vastly 
increase the number of plants as part of the most extreme shifts, the use of FBR plants 
will represent a net decrease in demand for raw nuclear material.  This reduction 
diminishes the need for security for the transport of nuclear fuel, private or otherwise.  
This assumes that each FBR operates in a closed cycle each producing its own fuel.  If 
these reactors are used to produce plutonium for other reactors, the transport of that fuel 
will add to the transport security burden.  At any rate, the challenge posed by the 
transportation of nuclear fuel by the changed nuclear future would resemble that of today, 
all else being equal, varying only in magnitude of regulatory action.  Thus the primary 
network security concern in the nuclear case is for the plants themselves.  
54B54B2. Plant Security 
The need for plant security represents the greatest change in security requirements 
posed by the nuclear course.  Since 9-11, the possibility of a terrorist attack on a nuclear 
plant has captured the attention of national leadership.FF177FF  Nuclear plants have long been 
attractive targets for terrorists and were even part of the original 9-11 target 
considerations.FF178FF  The defense the that nation’s 104 nuclear power plants employs over 
5,000 private security personnel trained to handle attacks in accordance with the Design 
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Basis Threat (DBT), a collection of classified threat scenarios developed by the Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission (NRC).FF179FF  The DBT document provides threats for which 
security systems should be designed to resist.  This design would include the engineering 
of the plant itself and the management of the security force.  Even as the DBT has been 
expanded to include greater threats, the DBT has been a source of debate between 
protection advocates and the nuclear energy industry.  Many advocate that the DBT 
should be increased to include more demanding threat scenarios, such as an aircraft attack 
or a larger ground attack with greater explosive capabilities.  The industry contends that 
the security against an air attack is already accounted for by other security measures often 
provided by the U.S. government.FF180FF  The U.S. Government Accounting Office (GAO) 
took the NRC to task for adjusting the DBT in response to industry complaints that 
certain threat weapons systems or modes of attack in the DBT were not affordable to 
defend against.FF181FF  This balancing act suggests that even the roles and responsibilities of 
nuclear plant security are not resolved. 
One could reasonably expect that any increase in threat toward nuclear facilities 
would drive an increase in federal involvement in plant security.  The price of failure is 
too high.  Even if NRC manages to push the bill to the private companies, the price falls 
on the U.S. public to fund.  Since nuclear power plant already have the most rigid 
security standards, any increase in nuclear plant capacity would represent a marked 
increase in security requirements in terms of investment, manpower, and regulatory 
effort. 
                                                 
179  Holt and Andrews, Nuclear Power Plant Security and Vulnerabilities, 2. 
180  United States. Government Accountability Office, Nuclear Power Plants Efforts made to 
Upgrade Security, but the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's Design Basis Threat Process should be 
Improved (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Govt. Accountability Office, 2006), 6; Holt and Andrews, Nuclear 
Power Plant Security and Vulnerabilities, 3. 
181  United States. Government Accountability Office, Nuclear Power Plants Efforts made to 




Transition to a nuclear power industry could improve energy resilience, but only 
by virtue of new construction, standard designs, and updates to response plans.  Building 
new energy infrastructure provides an opportunity to incorporate common designs, build 
in smarter monitoring and control systems, improve communications networks, develop 
common data protocols, and any number of improvements which might go along with a 
nation-wide mobilization of a power industry fueled by a trillion-dollar investment.  That 
said, none of these improvements are necessarily nuclear specific.  The nation might 
build a new fossil fuel system and realize the same benefits.  Because an update to the 
plant capacity does not necessitate improvements to the power grid itself, the primary 
weaknesses in the system would go unaddressed.  All of the problems with fault 
propagation, lack of redundancy, and tapped capacity would persist.  One key nuclear-
specific-benefit is the lower critical resource demand of FBR plants.  Because the 
demand for uranium is low, plants are less vulnerable to interruptions in raw material 
acquisition and transport systems, and could function independently with a smaller 
inventory of reserve uranium stock. 
34B34BC.  SOLAR INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION 
The solar case as provided in Chapter III does present a future markedly different 
from the status quo on all fronts.  The following breakdown takes the general structure of 
the suggested CSP, wind, and PV cell power network and reviews its network security, 
plant protection, and system resilience. 
56B56B1.  Network Security 
The solar prospect as outlined in this study presents a new type of power network.  
The change does not necessarily affect the small-word characterization of the power grid, 
but does affect the nature of power production within that network.  In some cases, the 
solar future represents a massive consolidation of power production, especially in the 
case of CSP.  In the most extreme case, CSP would provide nearly one third of the 
nation’s power from 2-3 thousand square miles of the south western desert.  This would 
 80
change Lewis’ observation that no plant will provide more than 1% of the country’s 
electrical energy.  Wind power would probably promote some concentration as well.  
Take the most extreme case where hundreds of thousands of wind turbines are put into 
place.  On the surface, this may look like an increase in distributed power, but remember 
that these turbines will likely be deployed thousands at a time in land areas restricted to 
certain regions of the country or off-shore.  This, combined with the CSP consolidation, 
would remake the grid to include more long-distance, critical links as part of grid’s weak 
middle.  A few adjustments to the solar scenario could address this problem.  First, the 
CSP consolidation could be used for hydrogen production to provide fuel for the 
transportation sector, 25% of the primary power demand.  Such a move would reduce 
demand on the grid and the criticality of the links to the southwestern desert.  Of course, 
hydrogen may not be the final solution for the transportation sector, and if not, these 
benefits may not come to fruition.  Another adjustment would entail an reduction in CSP 
capacity, increasing wind or PV to make up the difference.  Such a move may prove 
necessary, but at the expense of the efficiency gains with respect to EROI, which 
motivated the CSP consolidation in the first place.  Additionally, since these adjustments 
to the grid may involve the construction of new transmission lines there is the possibility 
that the new systems may benefit from new engineering advances.  Thus the few new 
strong links may be more secure than the many old links they are replacing.  One the 
other hand, there is generally no security for the thousands of miles of transmission lines.  
A determined enemy will find a way to break a critical link in a remote location (like the 
desert), no matter how well engineered the lines are.  Even if redundancies are provided, 
it is possible that there will be a reduction in the effort required for terrorists to disrupt a 
substantial portion of the network if there are fewer critical links. 
The greatest counter to the power consolidation problem is the combination of the 
third component to the solar future, photovoltaic (PV) cell capacity and energy storage.  
PV power capacity distributed to millions of facilities across the country would diminish 
the impact of any critical link breakage. 
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Figure 11.   Simple representation of nodes and links in the solar electrical power 
infrastructure network. CSP and Wind Energy feed the grid from the left, and PV 
power sources are dispersed throughout the system, often collocated with final 
customers. 
 
The presence of PV power sources throughout the power consumer base would 
detract from the impacts of any power grid breaks.  PV dissemination would also reduce 
the attractiveness of the grid as a target for terrorists.  Even though many would be 
without power, a large number would have enough power to support critical activities.  If 
the required energy storage capacity is provided, such a capability would provide a 
temporary source of power while grid repairs are completed.  These changes would make 
it difficult for terrorists to assess the impacts of an attack to the grid. 
Unlike the nuclear question, expansion of the solar network to include the supply 
networks for raw materials does not involve new security problems that differ 
substantially from the status quo.  Silicon, glass, concrete, steel, or other solar 
components have not captured the attention of strategy analysts as has fossil fuel supply 
or uranium.  Because the solar shift will relax demand for fossil fuels, one could 
reasonably suggest that such a change would relax anxiety over fossil fuel infrastructure 
security.  This fact may prove a net gain in security for the solar network. 
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57B57B2.  Plant Security 
Solar plants do not pose an interesting security problem as compared to the 
nuclear plant challenge.  Simply put, attacking a collection of wind turbines or a farm of 
CSP mirrors would involve a fairly tedious effort, without the drama of a nuclear panic.  
The destruction of the solar panels on a building will hardly make the front page.  The 
only concentration of plant capacity providing an interesting target would be the CSP 
plants in the desert.  These remote locations will benefit from a healthy standoff distance 
and a reduced local population within which a terrorist cell could operate.  For this 
reason, the bulk of the security problems are in the grid as already discussed. 
58B58B3.  Resilience 
Since the chief concern with the solar future is the status of the grid, the resilience 
of this new grid is of primary importance, because as mentioned, the complete protection 
of this vast system is probably not feasible, even with fewer critical links.  As in the 
nuclear case, the solar future will involve a great deal of new designs, new construction, 
and increased professional focus, which should all contribute to improved system 
resilience.  This effect may weigh heavier in the solar case, because of the increased grid 
construction required.  Of course this is a fairly obvious point.  Improvement through 
investment in new construction is a benefit that any energy future could realize once the 
funds become available.  Thus, the solar future security is enhanced in part because it 
costs more.  However, there are features which do enhance resilience in the system, that 
are unique to the solar future.  The previously made point about the effectiveness of an 
attack on the solar power infrastructure hold true mostly because of the resilience 
provided buy the PV distributed power capacity and from the required energy storage 
means.  The storage capacity benefit, although mandated by solar energy, is a purchase 
that could be made for any energy future, but few would expect such an investment 
without the emphasis solar brings. 
If there is a weak point in solar resilience, it comes from the addition of a new 
vulnerability, the weather.  Imagine a third of the nation’s energy supply affected by 
cloud cover in the desert or a change in wind patterns.  Naturally, this could be balanced 
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by other energy sources or the energy storage inventory.  How this would effect the 
system is difficult to surmise without delving into the engineering questions which 
surround each energy or storage choice available in the solar vision.  Unfortunately, like 
many of the solar energy questions, unless this study moves even more into the realm of 
unproven solutions, readers must settle for the answer: the engineers will solve this 
problem because they have to.  Nonetheless, because this new vulnerability is solar-
specific, it warrant some consideration. 
35B35BD. SUMMARY 
Between the solar and nuclear futures as represented in Chapter III, solar appears 
to offer the greatest improvement over the status quo.  Nuclear power provides a more 
attractive target set for terrorists and requires more physical security.  Each future does 
provide some improvements above the status quo and some concerns.  Power production 
concentration within the small-world power grid may provide attractive links for terrorist 
attack.  A necessity for all of the future options is a mammoth investment, providing an 
obvious conduit for improvement for both security and resiliency.  The most compelling 
departure from the status quo is the proposed distributed power capacity provided in the 
solar fortune, dampening the effects of any network failure, and reducing the 
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6B6BVII.  CONCLUSIONS  
Many predict that the world is destined to create a “post-petroleum age” the 
international community grapples with many dramatic changes in the next 20 years, from 
climate change and economic restructuring to nuclear weapons proliferation and strategic 
power rebalancing.FF182FF  The United States must build an energy future that can improve 
its security posture, while relieving the economic and environmental burdens of the status 
quo.  This thesis began with a measurement of these burdens in terms of potential oil 
shortage, energy independence, and climate change, and crafted goals for each challenge.  
These goals were next applied to two alternative energy futures, solar and nuclear energy, 
to determine what systems were required to meet the different goals.  Although these 
predictions were, for the most part, an extension of existing solutions with some history 
of performance, there is still a great deal of uncertainty in these forecasts.  Many 
problems have yet to be solved. 
As expected, these future prospects involve a massive mobilization of resources.  
The most demanding climate change goal requires a complete makeover of the energy 
industry, requiring a nearly complete replacement of fossil fuel systems by 2022.  As 
such, these goals push the U.S. energy infrastructure to incorporate hundreds of FBR 
nuclear plants or to construct an unprecedented solar infrastructure involving thousands 
of square miles of desert CSP plants, hundreds of thousands of wind turbines, millions of 
smaller PV systems installed on rooftops across the country, a drastically modified power 
grid, and an energy storage solution to manage fluctuations in solar energy supply. 
On the whole, both solar and nuclear futures represent improvements to security 
as compared to the fossil fuel industry.  Nuclear weapons proliferation being the most 
notable exception to this trend.  Table 12 summarizes the general findings for each 
criteria. 
                                                 
182  National Intelligence Council, "Global Trends 2025 a Transformed World," National Intelligence 
Council, HHUUhttp://www.dni.gov/nic/PDF_2025/2025_Global_Trends_Final_Report.pdfUUHH. (accessed November 
24, 2008). 
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Table 12.   Solar versus Nuclear - Security Criteria Summary 
Nuclear America Solar America 
Resource Access 
UUPros: 
- Greater U.S. control over reserves 
- FBR possibility for vastly reduced demand 
- Lower demand dampens drive toward 
resource nationalism and monopolistic/cartel 
control 
- Improved record of governance for countries 
that control uranium as compared to oil 
UUCons: 
- Uranium is an essential and limited resource 
- FBR solutions required to avoid eventual 
resource shortages 
UUPros: 
- The required variety of raw materials are 
readily available on the open market 
- No singular resource dependency vulnerable 
to resource nationalism 
- Many components are recyclable 
UUCons: 
- Significant demand for construction material 
and funding 
- Potential for rare-earth material requirements 
for PV and energy storage solutions 
Nuclear Weapons Proliferation 
UUPros: 
- Influx of research focus may yield breeder 
cycles without weapons grade material, or 
improve nuclear detection, defenses, 
forensics, or response 
UUCons: 
- Significant increase in the size of the nuclear 
industry vastly multiplies the security 
challenges with regard to nuclear technology, 
personnel, and weapons grade plutonium 
- Proliferation may seem inevitable, eroding the 
legitimacy of the non-proliferation regime 
- Disincentives for the development of a 
weapons program are diminished in terms of 
both cost and technical difficulty 
UUPros: 




- New plant construction offers opportunity to 
upgrade security designs, communications 
and monitoring systems, and response plans 
- FBR plants less vulnerable to resource supply 
interruption 
UUCons: 
- Nuclear plants are attractive targets for 
terrorism 
- Nuclear industry requires the most 
demanding plant security and the most rigid 
regulatory requirements 
- Does not address the vulnerabilities in the 
middle of the small-world network 
UUPros: 
- Resilience benefits from massive new 
construction effort for both plants and grid 
- Distributed PV power sources and required 
power storage solutions would reduce the 
impact of any power interruption 
- Plants are not interesting targets for attack 
UUCons: 
- Concentration of power capacity in the desert 
may provide critical links vulnerable to attack 
- Does not address the vulnerabilities in the 





As Table 12 illustrates, from a security perspective, solar would be the alternative 
of choice.  Nuclear power requires more security, carries the possibility for weapons 
proliferation, and involves potentially catastrophic consequences for security failure.  
These conclusions assume that solar power gets a pass on a few technical hurdles which 
may complicate the execution of the proposed outcomes, funding, storage solutions, and 
economy of scale to name a few.  If, for example, solar power cannot deliver on its 
promises, the question becomes, is nuclear power an improvement over the status quo?  
Policymakers must strike a balance between the need for a secure energy source and 
potential nuclear weapons proliferation. 
There is the possibility that the United States will reject the notion that it must 
choose between these possibilities.  Civilization’s addiction to energy grows with its 
supply.  Is it reasonable to expect the United States, or any other country for that matter, 
to ignore a profitable source of energy?  Consider a nation that intentionally neglects an 
energy source while their rivals pursue all possibilities.  Is such a course wise, or is it 
path to irrelevance?  Few predict a world with enough resources, energy, and prosperity 
to dispense with national rivalries before the need for this energy transformation.  These 
factors detract from any future predictions.  Although the EIA’s reference case may prove 
accurate, any number of breakthroughs or world events would send their experts back to 
the drawing board.  For these reasons, the security concerns for both solar and nuclear 
futures remain relevant as the world takes these steps toward a new energy future. 
Considering both potential futures, the above security criteria can provide a few 
general recommendations.  First, academic research must continue to refine the study of 
energy metrics such as EROI, outside the influence of market advocacy.  The EROI data 
available today is insufficient to provide policy analysis beyond the broad-brush studies 
such as this one.  With respect to the nuclear energy choice, nuclear advances must 
proceed in lockstep with non-proliferation dictates.  Research and development to 
mitigate proliferation should precede the standard FBR plant designs to be implemented 
throughout the country.  Both solar and nuclear futures provide an opportunity to advance 
resilience and security with updated designs and new construction.  The U.S. government 
should play a part in this remake of the industry to ensure the security benefits come to 
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fruition.  Collaboratively managing the design effort with private industry for 
standardized solutions may provide the required opportunity, even if such an effort 
requires federal funding.  Massive adjustments to the power grid should provide 
sufficient redundancies to raise the cost to those who would seek to interrupt power.  This 
would require several geographically separated links to the CSP plant capacity in the 
desert or to the larger wind farms.  Direct federal investment or a revised market 
incentive structure to encourage investment in the U.S. power grid are required to update 
the aging power grid, addressing a primary infrastructure vulnerability for all energy 
futures.  Solar markets should avoid dependence on any single rare-earth material, 
especially those controlled by other countries.  Finally, a case must be made to garner 
support for the multi-trillion dollar investment required to achieve these shifts.  This 
would likely require a world-wide campaign to publicize the benefits, consequences of 
failure, and the costs for such a transformation.  New energy must become the new norm.  
Without this movement, local political, regional rivalries, and economics will trump any 
attempts for cooperative solutions which may require short term sacrifice.  The United 
States has a leading part to play in this campaign as an advocate, an innovator, a provider, 
a partner, and a leader. 
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7B7BAPPENDIX – WORLD NUCLEAR REACTORS 
World Nuclear Plants in OperationFF183 
Reactor Type 
Average Capacity 
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